THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ROLE PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL DECISION-MAKERS

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read,
and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
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of Local Decision-Makers, submitted by Donald E.
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the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

This thesis contains an analysis of the results of a study applying the concept of role to local decision-makers. The study was conducted in Edmonton, Alberta and involved detailed interviews with all aldermen holding office between 1964 and 1967, the past three mayors of Edmonton, and two incumbent city commissioners.

The theoretical concept of "role" was used in the construction of an interview questionnaire aimed at discovering the "role perceptions" of participants in local government, or the empirical and normative expectations entertained by the incumbents of the positions of alderman, mayor, and commissioner for themselves and for each other. Interviews also dealt with recruitment experiences, career goals, and perceptions of party and interest group activity.

It was found that career goals of mayors and aldermen such as re-election plans and future political ambitions are related to recruitment experiences such as the route into civic politics and the adoption of an attachment to a political party.

Role perception itself, however, was found not to vary with the backgrounds of the elected decision-makers. Most are classifiable as "inventors" regardless of pre-

vious political socialization experiences. This is
attributed to the effect of office-holding in a non-
partisan, commissioner-council system dominated by
middle-class values.

Most respondents also feel that municipal politics
is distinct in nature from politics at other levels of
government. They feel that the system is and should be
nonpartisan.

Interest group activity is acknowledged but not
perceived as threatening by the respondents. Nor is
the satisfaction of group demands perceived to be the
major aim of policy-making.

The seeds of possible role conflict between the al-
dermen and the mayor and commissioners were uncovered.
The aldermen were jealous of encroachment on their policy-
making role by the mayor and commissioners, and the latter
were suspicious of attempts by aldermen to become involved
in administration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis contains the results of a research pro-
ject conducted in Edmonton, Alberta between November 1966
and April 1967. Research required detailed interviews with
sixteen aldermen and former aldermen, the incumbent mayor
and two former mayors, and two city commissioners[1] (chief
appointed administrators). Each interview lasted approx-
imately two hours.

The thesis is entitled Role Perceptions of Local
Decision-Makers because the concept of "role" was used
in the construction of an interview questionnaire focussed
on the part played by these people in the local political
process by virtue of their holding formal positions. Role
theory gives grounds for believing that certain character-
istic attitudes will be held by occupants of particular
positions in a social structure. The term "role perception"
has a rather elastic usage,[2] and the interviews covered
a wide range of subjects. The major aim of the study was

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[1]A third commissioner was appointed to fill a vacancy
while the study was in progress, but he expressed a reluc-
tance to be interviewed because of his lack of experience.
A Chief Commissioner was appointed after the interviewing
was completed.

[2]See Chapter II for an extended discussion.

to discover how these people felt about the requirements
of their jobs, about the characteristics of the institu-
tional and political setting they operate in, and to re-
late these attitudes to the backgrounds and experiences
of the decision-makers.

This study began with a number of objectives in
mind which help to show why this particular theoretical
approach was used. It was desired to find out the atti-
tudes, orientations and ambitions of local decision-makers
relevant to their performance of certain tasks in the
political system. The concept of role helps to establish
the criteria of relevance theoretically, by pointing out
that certain positions in institutional structures carry
with them sets of expectations about how the functions
for which these positions were created are to be performed.
Asking incumbents of these positions about their jobs, from
this perspective, helps to clarify the content and the ex-
tent of acceptance of these expectations.

Also, as is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter II,
knowledge of a decision-maker's role perception provides
some grounds for predicting his behavior in the legislative
situation, by providing information on his value system,
legislative goals, and his attitudes toward others in the
legislative relationship, all of which, when known, have
obvious implications for decision-making.

Given these objectives, it became necessary to probe

the backgrounds and political socialization experiences of
these decision-makers, in order to account for differences
in their attitudes. This is relevant to role perception
because the theory of role perception presumes role social-
ization takes place, a process by which the expectations
associated with a position are developed and intracepted
by the individual involved. Again, role serves to relate
this type of exercise, theoretically, to the positions
being analyzed.

It may perhaps clarify the nature of this study to
point out what it is not. It is not a study of "commun-
ity power." Only formal decision-makers were interviewed,
and even then, only the most visible. No direct attempt
was made to discover the parts these particular individuals
played in major policy decisions or power plays, although
this was often volunteered.

It is not a definitive study of local decision-makers.
The total number interviewed was twenty-one, and although
each was interviewed rather intensively, the small total
number and the restriction of the study to a single setting
obviates the possibility of using sophisticated statistical
techniques.

It is hoped that this study can serve to illustrate
some of the hypotheses which can be explored further using
this technique on a larger, comparative scale.

The remainder of this chapter contains a discussion

of the institutional and political setting of Edmonton, and a description of the interviewees.

Chapter II treats the use of the concept of role in general and in political science in particular, and the underlying theory justifying its use.

Chapter III outlines how the concept of role is used in this study, and presents some initial hypotheses which are explored in subsequent chapters.

Chapter IV examines the recruitment of the respondents, including the routes they followed into civic politics, their party attachments and career goals, and the possible effects of recruitment on "role socialization."

Chapter V presents the "role perception" of aldermen, what they feel people in their position should do in the local political system. The findings here are related to the type of political system found in Edmonton, which boasts nonpartisan, at-large elections and a commissioner-council system of administration.

Chapter VI examines the perceptions the respondents themselves have of this type of political system, particularly their perceptions of its nonpartisan nature and the activity of interest groups.

Chapter VII examines possible sources of "role conflict," or conflicting expectations of the part to be played by aldermen, mayor, and commissioners in local government.

Chapter VIII, the concluding chapter, relates the findings of this study to others using the role concept, and to more traditional studies of local government. The implications this study has for models or typologies of decision-makers are also examined here.

The Setting

Edmonton is a large city by Canadian standards (population 357,696, fourth in Canada, according to the 1964 Civic Census), with a population largely of British origin (46 per cent), and large German, Ukrainian and French minorities (12, 11 and 7 per cent respectively). Seventy per cent of the inhabitants are Canadian-born.[3]

The economy relies heavily on agricultural service and processing industries, and petro-chemical industries. The city has doubled in size in the last twenty years and vies with Calgary, Alberta for the title of "fastest-growing city in Canada." This probably accounts for the preoccupation of most of the respondents with the problems of planning and development. This is examined more closely in Chapter IV.

Elections are held every two years, at which time the mayor, twelve aldermen, seven public school trustees, and seven separate school trustees are elected at large.

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[3]These figures are taken from Julian Suski, Edmonton, 3rd ed. (Edmonton, Alberta: The City of Edmonton, 1965), passim.

Elections are conducted on a nonpartisan basis,[4] although various groups at one time or another field slates of candidates.

The city is governed under the provisions of a provincial statute, the City Act (Chapter 42 of the Revised Statutes of Alberta, 1955), although a new city act is being drawn up. The executive and legislative power lies with the council and mayor, but part of the executive and administrative power is delegated to three[5] commissioners appointed by council (who can be dismissed by a resolution of council supported by three-quarters of all the members of council), who, with the mayor, constitute the Commission Board. This system is unique to large cities in Western Canada, but bears some similarity to the city manager system used in some smaller cities in Canada, and extensively in the United States. The mayor is employed full time and attends all Commission Board meetings as a full member.

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[4]Eugene C. Lee, in The Politics of Nonpartisanship (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1960), p. 18, defines nonpartisanship as "a form of election in which party labels do not appear on the ballot." Although he makes qualifications as they become necessary, this definition would make Edmonton and Canadian Federal elections "nonpartisan" and provincial elections "partisan." It is perhaps more useful in Canada, if more complicated, to restrict the definition in advance to exclude systems where political parties publicly nominate or endorse candidates.

[5]Four since May 1, 1967.

On May 1, 1967, city council appointed a Chief
Commissioner, but it is too early, at the time of writing,
to tell what changes will result. It would seem that this
type of system change could curtail the mayor's direct par-
ticipation in city administration.

Electoral History[6]

Since the late 1930's, municipal elections have been
dominated by one group. Since 1936, candidates nominated
by the Citizens' Committee or its variants[7] have never
failed to hold a majority of council seats. The three
mayors interviewed in this study, all the mayors since 1950,
have all at one time been sponsored or supported by this
group. The group appears to be composed mainly of downtown
businessmen, builders, and representatives of real estate
firms, investment firms and insurance companies, who meet
before elections to nominate a slate of candidates.

Generally speaking candidates are not pledged to
support a particular platform, but are picked because of
their acceptability to this group. Pains are taken to
compose a slate representative of business, the professions,
and labor, but not, apparently, in proportion to their

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[6]Most of this section is based on an unpublished
Master of Arts Thesis by George M. Betts, "The Edmonton
Aldermanic Election of 1962" (Department of Political Sci-
ence, University of Alberta, 1963), chaps. III and IV.

[7]Presently the Better Civic Government Committee
(BCGC).

numbers in the community. An attempt is made to include
candidates who are supporters of different political par-
ties. Twelve of the sixteen aldermen in this study were
sponsored by this group at some time, but one now sits
as an independent.

Various groups have sprung up in opposition to this
group, but none has had much success. The Civic Rights
Protective Association (CRPA) was formed in 1962 in re-
sponse to a by-law which would have resulted in prosecution
for people who had installed basement suites in their homes
without a permit, after a zoning change in 1960. Members
also appear to be champions of the "citizen versus City
Hall," and to favor plebiscites on money by-laws which
would incur debts not payable within the current year. The
CRPA, unlike the BCGC, holds regular meetings, but appears
to be dominated by its lone representative on council.

The latest attempt to provide a broadly-based alter-
native to the Citizens' Committee was made in 1963, with
the formation of the United Voters' Association (UVO).
This group was formed from the League of Edmonton Electors,
Civic Rights Protective Association, and the Civic Reform
Association (a dissident wing of the Citizens' Committee)--
representing, respectively, labor and the professions, small
property owners, and the type of people normally associated
with the Citizens' Committee. The CRPA split off from
the UVO in 1964 and ran its own slate, and was the only

group other than the BCGC to field candidates in 1966.

Only one CRPA member was elected. (Two former UVO

members were elected, but as independents.)

Regular political parties have not been very success-

ful in contesting municipal elections. After being swept

into power provincially in 1935, the Social Credit Party

elected three aldermen, but none were successful in 1936.

A coalition slate of Social Credit Party, Co-operative

Commonwealth Federation, Canadian Labor Party, and Com-

munist Party candidates unsuccessfully contested the civic

election of 1937 as the Progressive Civic Association.

No candidates running under party banners have been suc-

cessful since 1943, when a CCF candidate was elected. No

candidates have used a party label since 1945.

The most recent potential threat to Citizens' Com-

mittee dominance came in 1959 when a judicial inquiry found

the incumbent Citizens' Committee mayor guilty of gross

misconduct in office. A dissident group from the Citizens'

Committee formed the Civic Reform Association and fielded

some of its own candidates. By 1961, however, most were

back together again under the label, Civic Government

Association, now known as the Better Civic Government

Committee.[8]

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[8]This continuity of the Citizens' Committee is demon-
strated by Betts, who bases his conclusions on interviews
with members of the groups evolving from it.

As in most municipal elections, particularly where elections are conducted on an at-large basis, voter turn-out is low in Edmonton, and incumbents are usually re-elected.[9] Table 1 gives turn-out figures since 1948.

TABLE 1

VOTER TURN-OUT IN EDMONTON
CIVIC ELECTIONS
(1948-1964)[10]

1948	....	14.4%	1957	....	35.3[a]
1949	....	30.0[a]	1958	....	12.8
1950	....	35.0	1959	....	34.2[a]
1951	....	41.9[a]	1960	....	16.7
1952	....	12.6	1961	....	37.1[a]
1953	....	11.2[b]	1962	....	25.4
1954	....	19.5	1963	....	56.3[a]
1955	....	11.2[b]	1964	....	47.6[a]
1956	....	10.0			

[a]Mayor and aldermen elected.

[b]Mayor elected by acclamation.

As can be seen from the table, turn-out is usually higher when the mayor's position is at stake. Turn-out may remain at a comparatively high level, compared to past performance, because an electoral change adopted in

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[9]That nonpartisanship and at-large elections are associated with more frequent re-election of incumbents is demonstrated for the United States by Charles E. Gilbert and Christopher Clague, "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities," Journal of Politics, 24 (May 1962), 323-349.

[10]Turn-out figures are from unpublished research on Edmonton Civic Elections by A. L. Shingadia, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, 1966.

1963 provides for all aldermen and the mayor to be elected together every two years (instead of electing the mayor and half the council one year and the other half the next, all for two year terms). Incumbents have been defeated only in 1955, 1960 and 1966, during the period for which turn-out figures are given.

The Respondents

Sixteen aldermen and former aldermen were interviewed. With one exception, all were incumbents of either the 1964-1966 council, the present council (elected in 1966), or both. The exception was an alderman who did not seek re-election in 1964 because of poor health.[11] He was interviewed because of his long experience (five years, topping the polls each time he ran), and in order to "pretest" the questionnaire. Only four other aldermen did not also sit on the 1964-1966 council. Three of these were elected for the first time in 1966, and the fourth sat previously (1957-59). With three exceptions then, all those interviewed had at least two years experience as aldermen.

Five of the aldermen were born in Alberta (three in Edmonton). All but two of the rest were born in other places in Canada. One-half are over 55 years of age, the oldest being 73 and the youngest 31. The same proportion

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[11]This respondent is excluded from all tabulations in the text.

(one-half) have lived in Edmonton over half their lives.
Only two have lived in the city for less than 25 per cent
of their lives. Nine have attended university, seven
holding university degrees; four with primary schooling
only account for most of the rest.

Six aldermen are or have been mainly businessmen, two
teachers, two medical doctors, three housewives, one a
lawyer, and the other spent most of her working life in a
skilled labor occupation.

Most of the group (ten) have had no family history
of public office holding, but most claim to have been
interested in politics since childhood. This is investigated
further in Chapter IV.

Recruitment into municipal politics for most (ten)
seems to have been through "community service," the
most common channels being through activity in community
leagues, service clubs, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, or
the Chamber of Commerce, leading to their running for, or
being persuaded to run for, office after becoming known
in the community.

Only four of the group were active in provincial or
federal politics before entering the municipal field. For
most of the others (i.e., the "community service" people),
party activity came after election to municipal office, if
at all.

One mayor was a lawyer; two were businessmen. Two

of the mayors started out as aldermen, but were elected

by their colleagues to fill unexpired mayoralty terms,

then decided to run for the mayoralty themselves.[12] The

third was persuaded to run for mayor after an active career

in provincial politics.

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[12]In one case, the incumbent mayor fell ill, and
in the other, the incumbent mayor was removed from office
by the courts for violating a section of the City Act.
Ironically, in that he got his own start in the mayoralty
by replacing an incumbent who resigned, the latter was
defeated by the alderman who had been elected to serve
out his term.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF ROLE

It became necessary to undertake a fairly elaborate
examination of role theory because its use is fairly
limited in political science. The studies utilizing the
role concept to any great extent are largely the product
of Heinz Eulau, John Wahlke and their associates, who used
it in studying legislative behavior.[1] Studies of local
legislatures (i.e., municipal councils) are even more
limited in terms of material published, and are the product
of a study of city councils and pressure groups in the San
Francisco area directed by Heinz Eulau.[2]

Wahlke and associates justify their use of the

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[1]John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and
LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations
in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1962); and John C. Wahlke et al., "American State
Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups,"
Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), 203-227.

[2]Betty H. Zisk, "The Group Struggle: Perceptions of
Influence by Actors in Small Legislative Systems" (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1964);
Betty H. Zisk, Heinz Eulau, and Kenneth Prewitt, "City
Councilmen and the Group Struggle: A Typology of Role
Orientations," Journal of Politics, 27 (1965), 618-646;
and, Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and
Policy Outcomes: A Study of Development in a Metropolitan
Region," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, September 1966.

concept by the "fact" that "role has been used with rela-
tively minor variations in sociology, anthropology and
social pshcyology which indicates its probable utility
for tying together the concerns of 'institutional,' 'func-
tional,' and 'behavioral' studies in political science."[3]
They feel that by considering the legislature as a sub-
system of the political system, and the institution of
the legislature as a system of role relationships they
can, using role, investigate a number of the determinants
of legislative behavior and, at the same time, estimate
the consequences of such behavior for the functioning of
the system.

It will be pointed out in what follows that the concept
of role is not as unambiguous as Wahlke et al. seem to
believe, and that they ignore certain problems that arise
when moving between the levels of analysis of individual,
group and system. Also, the concept of role has a dynamic
aspect which is not adequately discussed.

The Concept of Role:

Definitions and Usage

Before going into role theory in more detail, some
definitions of terms used with the concept and the objec-
tives of studies using it will be examined.

The credit for introducing the concept of role to

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[3]The Legislative System . . . , p. 7.

social science is usually given to Ralph Linton who,
in The Study of Man and The Cultural Background of
Personality, introduced it to cultural anthropology.
Gross et al.[4] in giving Linton credit for this innovation,
place his definition of role in the first category of
their three-fold classification scheme as equating it
(role) with, or defining it to include, normative culture
patterns, or that "role" consists of the values and behavior-
al standards prescribed by society for the occupants of
particular statuses or positions.

The other categories are (2) those definitions in
which "role is treated as an individual's definition of
his situation with reference to his and others' social
positions,"[5] and (3), those "definitions which deal with
role as the behavior of actors occupying social positions."[6]
The three basic ideas which appear in all these definitions
are that individuals "(1) in social locations (2) behave
(3) with reference to expectations." Gross et al. settle
for a definition of "role" as "a set of evaluative standards
applied to the incumbent of a particular position."[7]

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[4]Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, Alexander W. McEachern,
Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Super-
intendency Role (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958),
chap. 2.

[5]Ibid., p. 13.

[6]Ibid., p. 14.

[7]Ibid., p. 17.

They place no restrictions on the definers of the expectations, but leave this to be determined by the purposes of a particular inquiry. As will be made more clear below, it is the main thesis of this chapter that the source of these "expectations" is crucial to any explanation using the concept of role.

This review of the definitions of the concept of role brings sharply into focus level-of-analysis problems. Not only does a "role" have a different content on each level, but the purpose in using the concept apparently differs. On the level of system, covered by the cultural anthropological definition, role is used to account for continuity and differentiation of the allocation and performance of tasks in society; the social psychological definition, on the individual level, to deal with the interaction of personality and social structure; and the sociological definition, on the group level, to deal with group dynamics and task performance as related to role perception.

In their own study, Gross <u>et al</u>. were less concerned with having their respondents (school superintendents and school board members) define the content of the superintendency role themselves, but presented each group with hypothetical situations complete with alternative choices of courses of action or empirical possibilities, and then recorded the action preferences or expectations of each group.

In their study, the authors derived their "evaluative standards" in a a priori manner from the literature and from their own theorizing. This was justified from their (sociological) point of view, because they were concerned with examining "role consensus" as a dependent variable (rather than taking it for granted as in previous, anthropological, studies, where only normative culture patterns were examined and not the opinions or actual behavior of individuals.). They wanted the alternatives to be exhaustive in potential conflict situations and to examine the different choices between and within groups. The point is, however, that they derived the evaluative standards from "beyond" the groups and individuals concerned.

Wahlke et al. opted for a different strategy, tending toward a social psychological approach, where the aim was to determine awareness of the content of a role rather than to present respondents with all the logical possibilities in a choice situation. By relying largely on open-ended questions, the authors forced the respondents themselves to define the content of the role of legislator. Certain analytically distinct sectors of the position of legislator were outlined in advance to give some direction to the questioning, but, for the most part, the legislators themselves were required to enumerate the expectations they were aware of and endorsed, both for occupants of their own positions and for complementary positions, for example,

formal leaders in the legislature, party representatives, interest group spokesmen, and constituents.

This approach has the advantage that the respondent is presented with situations that are less hypothetical, because it is largely his own experiences that are probed. If only the most salient expectations entertained by the respondent for himself and others are obtained, it would seem that one has improved the predictability of a respondent's behavior when a situation affecting these expectations arises. For example, if one asks the question (as Wahlke et al. did), "What are the most important things a legislator should do?" and follows it with suitable probing to ensure a complete answer, one has apparently uncovered attitudes governing much of the respondent's behavior as a legislator.

Before going on to discuss the theoretical basis of the role concept, it would perhaps be useful to make some distinctions among terms, in order to make it clear as to whether we are discussing attitudes or behavior, norms or an individual's perception of them, and the relationships of positions under study. If we accept role as a set of expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular position (i.e., Gross et al.'s definition noted above), subject to the qualifications noted above[8] and in the next section, we should distinguish role perception (an

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[8]See p. 16.

individual's perception of his role, which may or may not coincide with "role" as defined here) from role behavior (overt behavior of the incumbent of a particular position, which may or may not coincide completely with the dictates of "role" or "role perception"). Focal positions are positions under direct examination, and counter positions are positions related formally or informally in interaction with focal positions. For example, for the focal position of legislator, there exist such counter positions as party representative, group spokesman, administrator, and legislative leader, with corresponding sets of expectations.[9]

The Concept of Role: Theory

Given the different definitions and usages of "role" just outlined, it may seem perverse to discuss "role theory"; however, there seems to be a certain core of assumptions shared by the studies just cited. As one might expect, the theory contains a number of empirical assumptions, but they differ slightly depending on whether the level of analysis is the individual, the group, or the system.

The discussion which follows will be concerned with the concept of role applied to incumbents of positions in

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[9]Some scholars make a further classification of the relationships between focal and counter positions as "role sectors." See for example, Gross et al., op. cit., chap. 4; and Wahlke et al., op. cit., pp. 11-14.

institutional frameworks, that is, structures with a large degree of continuity and differentiation of function. Thus, built into the theory, is an assumption that incumbents, through some process of recruitment and socialization associated with a position, will develop a fairly extensive and stable set of expectations for themselves and others in positions in the same structure. This would not necessarily be the case in situations where interaction proceeded on a more ad hoc basis.

Related to this assumption is an assumption that a position is a location in a network of social relationships, and therefore must be studied in relation to one or more counter positions. It is the connections between counter positions that produces a system.

Beyond this point, the underlying assumptions of role theory come into conflict, because of the different levels of analysis involved. A common assumption is that certain roles are characteristically associated with certain positions; however, this seems to mean different things on different levels. We have seen that the concept of role was introduced at the system level to account for continuity in the performance of system functions. Role was viewed, here, as the basic unit of socialization, for it is through roles that tasks in society are allocated and arrangements made to ensure their performance.[10] The content of a

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[10]Erving Goffman, Encounters (Indianapolis: Bobbs-

particular role is determined on this level by the functions associated with a given position. The distinction between role and position is a useful one drawing attention to the continuity of function regardless of personnel changes. The "expectations" associated with a particular position are "given" by custom and tradition; an incumbent steps into a behavior pattern already completely prescribed for him.

On the group and individual levels, however, role has a dynamic quality and is in a sense "emergent" depending on the interaction and personalities of individuals. A conception of role as wholly cultural does not allow for the "personal-idiosyncratic" definitions of a role held by different actors in an institutional relationship (the individual level of analysis), nor the dynamic, social aspects of the interaction that constitutes the relationship (the group level).[11] On the group level, role content (i.e., expectations) will presumably develop and change in response to conflicting expectations and the demands of interaction situations.

Thus, one must be careful to make clear in what sense one is using the term "role." On the system level of

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Merrill Co., Inc., 1965), p. 87.

[11]See Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 40, for a brief discussion of these distinctions.

analysis, one talks about socialization into roles and accounts for the stability (or lack of it) by the effectiveness of this process. However, if one does not go beyond this, one is left with a tautology. "Role" is introduced "after the fact" to account for continuity and stability in the performance of system functions. If one then blames ineffective "role socialization" for instability, one is only stating what was implied in the definition of "role," and the argument is devoid of empirical content.

If one wishes to operationalize and measure role, one must descend below the system level of analysis and examine the process by which group dynamics and individual personality affect role perception. In other words, one must discover the "expectations" entertained by the occupants of particular positions themselves. By doing this, one moves from the definitional level (role) to the empirical level (role perception).

The Concept of Role on the Individual and Group Levels of Analysis

On the system level, people in similar positions are assumed to perform their tasks in similar ways because they have been socialized into doing so. The structure of society rests on a system of relationships governed by custom and cultural prescription.

Analysis on this level ignores the importance of

interaction on the group level and the impact the individual can have on social structure through his own role "definition" or role perception. Fortunately the concept of role is elastic enough to cover a "role" whose content is not completely prescribed culturally or functionally, but is in part "emergent" or dependent on the character of the interaction of the incumbents of positions and personality differences of the individuals themselves. This is particularly visible when one examines social structures below the level of the whole society such as legislatures, which have been the main concern here.

Analysis restricted to the system level cannot take account of the variability of behavior of the incumbents of the same positions and thus displays deficiencies as an explanatory tool. Explanation requires "sub-system" analysis.

Before examining the sources of variation in role perception, it would be wise to examine some of the empirical assumptions underlying the concept, which justify its use. The most obvious one has already been touched upon--overt behavior is conditioned by role perception. That is, what a person does will be influenced by what he feels he ought to do, as well as by the anticipated reactions of others. Both of these influences as perceived by the individual are measurable in principle.

The obvious reaction to this first assumption is

"how can you be sure that role perception influences overt behavior?" The authors of The Legislative System, unable in their study to verify their predictions, anticipated this objection and countered it with an argument about rationality:

> One cannot assume otherwise: to assume that verbal behavior prior to action is invariably "false" would doom all human behavior to irrationality. It is much more plausible to assume that men will behave in terms of the roles they are expected to take and which, of course, they redefine for themselves, and to seek explanations for deviations from expected behavior patterns after they have occurred.[12]

While acceptable as a working justification of the role approach, this assumption is no substitute for ultimate empirical verification, as the authors are willing to admit.

This comment also raises the problem of the reliability of the answers of particular respondents, but this raises no problems in principle.

Another related assumption, also employed in The Legislative System, holds that role perceptions will be a crucial factor governing the behavior of legislators as a group and thereby affecting the access, influence or power of all those in counter positions to the position of legislator. This means that not only is role an important variable governing an individual's behavior, it has an important indirect impact on the responsiveness

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[12]p. 244.

of the legislature in terms of efficiency, amount, and direction of output.

A study of role perception is a convenient method for obtaining the resultant of the demands and expectations of society, inter- and intra-group demands and expectations, and individual pecularities by studying their intraception by the individual, as revealed in interviews. It is in this way that we make "role" operationally precise in the sense of finding something that can be measured. Role consensus and conflict, between and within groups, can be more easily measured and accounted for by giving role this dynamic content. Also, given the preceding assumptions, one has eliminated the necessity for discovering all these demands independently, if one's goal is discovery of their potential impact on behavior, and not complete explanation of how this impact operates.

Sources of Variation in Role Perception and Role Behavior

One definition of "attitude" is "a predisposition to experience, to be motivated by, and to act toward, a class of objects in a predictable manner."[13] If one considers counter positions, tasks associated with positions, and societal demands as such classes, one can look to personality theory for observations relevant to role perception as

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[13]M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner and Robert W. White, Opinions and Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 33.

a behavioral variable. Rather than taking the relevant content of a role as "given" by cultural and functional demands, and assuming that individuals in the same positions will behave in the same way, one can look for sources of variability in role definition and role behavior.

One such consideration is "awareness" or "salience," already referred to above.[14] A well-established finding in opinion research is that overt behavior is conditioned by the situation in which it occurs and that an opinion toward a hypothetical situation elicited in an interview may not correspond to behavior when the actual situation is encountered.[15] This is one justification for the use of "open-ended" questions in which respondents are free to draw on their own experiences in giving an answer.[16]

Related to this is the matter of "intensity," or how strongly a person feels about a particular aspect of his role. This is particularly important if a particular behavior pattern is permitted by his role, but not required. Within the realm of required behavior, an in-

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[14]See pp. 18-19.

[15]A case could probably be made for role studies being used to uncover basic attitudes rather than more transitory opinion, but a discussion of the "opinion-attitude" controversy would lead too far afield.

[16]This is the rationale behind many of the questions asked in this study. See Appendix.

cumbent of a position may feel less intense about those
aspects for which deviance from the expectations of others
carries what are perceived to be minor or tolerable sanc-
tions, and his role behavior may be affected accordingly.

There may be certain ambiguities in the contents of
the prescribed roles themselves, such as conflict between
formal and informal norms, conflicting viewpoints at
different points in a hierarchy or between counter positions,
as well as disagreement about what behavior is required and
what is only permitted. For example, there may be conflict
between norms of purpose and norms of procedure where the
latter delay or prevent pursuit of goals. A mayor and his
aldermen may entertain conflicting conceptions of their
respective places in the structure and process of govern-
ment. There may not be opportunities for fulfilling role
requirements for lack of finance or conflicting jurisdic-
tion, where formal rules are ambiguous. Any one of these
situations could create a "role dilemma" resulting in
modification of a role, failure to act, or intra- and
inter-position conflict.[17] These dilemmas may be per-
sistent, in which case role perception may be affected
permanently, or role behavior may deviate only temporarily
from role perception.

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[17]For a detailed elaboration of the kinds of situa-
tions mentioned see Daniel Levinson, "Role, Personality
and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting,"
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58 (1959), 170-180.

We have outlined then, sources of variation in "role perception" and "role behavior." In addition to different socialization experiences, ambiguity in what is required or expected of the incumbent of a particular position can lead to conflicting perceptions on the part of incumbents of focal positions and counter positions. Even after a fairly comprehensive "role perception" has been developed by the individual, his actual "role behavior" may not coincide with it, because of capitulation in the face of conflicting expectations, or other pressures in an interaction situation. However, it is assumed in this study, as in Wahlke et al.'s,[18] that "role perception" will govern a large part of behavior, and that once it has developed, conflicting expectations will be opposed. This is not to say, however, that role perception cannot be modified in the long run if persistent difficulties are encountered in its performance.

If the content of a role is constructed by combining the role perceptions of incumbents of relevant positions (that is, positions with well-developed formal and informal contacts), as would be done on this level of analysis, one could attempt to provide an evaluation of the effectiveness and operation of role socialization processes, and begin to account for the differences in role perceptions among and between incumbents of focal positions and counter

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[18]See above, p. 25.

positions. One could even begin to assess the probability
of various courses of action being undertaken, and the
points in the decision-making process where tensions
might arise. This is the exercise undertaken in Chapter III.
In most of what follows, the position of alderman will be
treated as the focal position (the position under direct
examination), and the positions of mayor and commissioner
as counter positions.

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF ALDERMAN

This chapter applies some of the theory developed in Chapter II to an examination of the role of alderman in a local political system. If the comments made about using different levels of analysis are valid, it should be illuminating to examine the implications for the role of alderman derived from each level.

As was pointed out above,[1] on the system level, roles consist of the cultural expectations associated with the task performance of the incumbents of particular positions. Given the positions, role requirements delimit the ways of carrying out the functions for which the positions exist, goals to be strived for, and the values to be embodied in policy-making. Some suggestions as to what these prescriptions might be for the type of system in Edmonton will be presented.

This chapter will also examine potential sources of role conflict and the potential sources of differences in role content on the individual and group levels, with implications, respectively, for role behavior and role perception.

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[1]See pp. 21-22.

The System Level: Cultural
Role-Demands

A conception of role concerned completely with this level would look at system functions and the cultural prescriptions associated with them. This section will treat local government as part of a local political system with functions structures, recruitmentment and socialization processes of its own, to justify the use of the role concept.

Banfield and Wilson assign two functions to governments in local political systems: a "service" function, or the supplying of goods and services which cannot be (or are not) supplied privately, and a "political" function, or the mediating of group conflict over public policy.[2] Eyestone and Eulau classify these functions more generally as "adaptive" and "adjustive" functions.[3] In the former case, the environment is manipulated with some end state in mind, and in the latter, policy formation is a reaction to the physical and social environment.

The Eyestone and Eulau formulation will be used here, because it is more inclusive and does not prejudge the case by assuming that the pluralist "referee" function is

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[2]Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press and M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 18.

[3]"City Councils and Policy Outcomes . . . ."

performed in every system. The distinction between
adaptive and adjustive functions is crucial given the
approach of this study, because it is hypothesized below
that aldermen in the type of system described for Edmonton
will conceive themselves to be manipulators of the environ-
ment, rather than merely registering shifts in the power
relationships of influential groups.

Given these functions, what does the structural and
cultural makeup of Edmonton imply for their performance?
Edmonton has at-large elections, conducted on a formally
nonpartisan basis (political party affiliations do not
appear on the ballot, and parties do not openly become
involved in campaigns), and a council-commissioner form of
administration. The extensive literature on systems of
this type[4] can be used as a source of "role prescription"
on this level.

First of all, "at-large elections are a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for enabling middle class
values to prevail."[5] Add nonpartisanship and a commissioner-
council administration to thie type of system, and, other

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[4]See for example Edward C. Banfield and James Q.
Wilson, op. cit.; Edward C. Banfield, ed., Urban Govern-
ment (New York: The Free Press, Inc., 1961); Oliver P.
Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963); and Dennis A. Young,
"Canadian Local Government Development: Some Aspects of the
City Commissioner and City Manager Forms of Administration,"
Canadian Public Administration, 9 (1966), 55-68.

[5]Williams and Adrian, op. cit., chap. 13.

things being equal, the purposive role orientation of inventor and the representational role of trustee are likely prescriptions.

The typology of "representational" and "purposive" roles constructed by Wahlke et al.[6] is used here. The most relevant for our purposes are the representational roles of trustee (a free agent who follows his convictions and principles, and the dictates of his conscience), delegate (one who follows the instructions and demands of his constituents even if they conflict with his own principles), and politico (a combination of the delegate and trustee roles); and the purposive roles of tribune (one who feels the legislature and legislators should be advocates or defenders of popular demands), inventor (one who sees the legislature as a creative, policy-making, problem-solving institution, rather than one merely reacting to the environment), and broker (one who sees the legislature as an institution for integrating the conflicting demands of interest groups).

A "delegate" role would fit less well because the "ideology" of nonpartisanship and at-large elections requires the formation of policies without regard to special or sectional interests. An alderman is neither formally associated with a particular section of the population, nor vulnerable if its demands are not met.

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[6]See The Legislative System, chap. 11 for purposive, and chap. 12 for representational, roles.

The role of "broker" is incompatible with a system
in which policies are to be formed in the "interests of
the collectivity," and where a professional, non-elected
body (the Board of Commissioners) is responsible for applying
a fixed standard in administration, and where personnel
selection is not influenced by patronage.[7]

The "inventor" role is appropriate because the
system demands provision for growth and amenities (such
as parks and libraries) rather than the maintenance of
traditional services at a minimal level. Also, the system
demands the cultivation of a good business climate through
the provision of industrial services and comprehensive
zoning plans. A city wanting to promote a "progressive"
image cannot afford to delay planning and development de-
cisions in order to pacify contesting groups. Also, in
so far as the administration subscribes to professional
administrative and technical standards, it will not be
content with a static, caretaker role.

"Inventors" will be wary of group demands unless
they are expressed in the interests of the "collectivity."
A demand for a downtown civic center development is made
more acceptable by the advertising of the increased parking
it will provide, as well as increased business for the whole
area, and perhaps a library or art gallery. A society

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[7]Needless to say, in this and what follows, I have
discussed the rationale behind, and not the actual opera-
tion of, this type of system.

almost by definition governed by middle class values may,
in this way, make for selective reception of group demands.

As for the expectations coming from the counter
positions of mayor and commissioners, in addition to
those already mentioned, certain characteristics of the com-
missioner-council system are a useful source.[8]   This
system removes most of the responsibility for administra-
tion from the council, leaving them free to devote more
time to the formulation of policy; it furnishes the city
with professional administrative management; and furnishes
the city with continuity of administration, allowing more
effective long-term planning.[9]

Thus we may expect the commissioners to resist inter-
ference by aldermen in day-to-day administration, further
discouraging the performance of tribune and broker roles.
Their commitment to long-range planning should complement
the inventor role predicted for the alderman in this type
of system. The most basic expectation on the system level,
then, is a division of labor between council and commis-
sioners, with the former responsible for policy-making and
the latter for administration.

The mayor holds an ambiguous formal position, being
elected in a manner similar to the aldermen, yet being a

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[8]Elaboration of this source is reserved for Chapter
VII.

[9]See Young, loc. cit.

full member of the Commission Board. For this reason,
analysis of the alderman-mayor relationship will be re-
served for the next section.

The Group and Individual Levels: Role Definition and Role Conflict

The foregoing was presented to indicate some of
the possible societal and structural expectations associ-
ated with the position of alderman in a particular type of
system. The list is undoubtedly incomplete, especially
since what is logically implied by this type of system may
not correspond to actual social prescription. This kind
of exercise does reveal some of the role sectors which
might be profitably examined in an interview study: re-
lationships between mayor, aldermen and administrators,
relationships of each of them with group spokesmen, and
the vision each has for the role of local government.
As was emphasized in Chapter II, there are several kinds
of factors which might serve to make the role perception
and role behavior of the individual fail to correspond with
societal prescription or functional demands. Basically
these are factors of ambiguity in the content or "re-
quiredness" of norms themselves, and the effect of in-
dividual personalities and particular situations on the
intraception of these norms. An interview study of alder-
men would presumably tap the resultant of the operation
of these kinds of factors. Some of these factors are

presented here to suggest possible fruitful lines of invest-
igation in any explanation of this process, without assum-
ing in advance that role perception will correspond with
the expectations associated with the "good government"
philosophy.

First of all, there are ambiguities in the system
norms themselves. The professional administration is
responsible for "administration" and the council for
"policy formation." Aldermen may differ with administra-
tors on where to draw the line between the two functions.
In a system, as in Edmonton, where the job of mayor is
full-time and involves participating in the decisions of
the commissioners and day-to-day administration, aldermen
may object to being excluded from administration, as they
share the same constituency (the whole city) and mandate
(popular election) as the mayor. This becomes more impor-
tant when in fact the administration is responsible for many
of the policy proposals considered by the council.

This leads to another important consideration, the
criteria of decision-making. The system norms would ap-
pear to favor policy decisions being made on a "universal-
istic" (fixed, uniform standard) rather than a "particular-
istic" basis, with the possible emphasis of economic
criteria (e.g., efficiency and least cost) rather than social
factors (e.g., minimization of dislocation through urban
renewal and of individual grievances resulting from

development policies). Even if the aldermen share the professional standards of the administration, they may be less cosmopolitan in outlook and demand the utilization of local professionals in development programs, and, more importantly, be more willing to modify development programs if they are opposed by electorally significant groups.

As was pointed out in Chapter II, role presupposes that a process of role socialization takes place before the "expectations" or "role" associated with a particular position are adopted by an individual. Experiences leading up to the occupation of a particular position need not be the same for everyone, and thus may be productive of different values and career goals on the part of aldermen. Even if the middle class "good government" ethos, oriented toward business, prevails in the type of system described here, the recruitment patterns of aldermen may be associated with differences in the extent to which the role prescriptions of this type of system are accepted. Those who follow the route of "community service" through activity in the Chamber of Commerce, service clubs and similar associations will presumably be more likely to subscribe to these prescriptions than those entering civic politics as a means of achieving satisfaction for the demands of socio-economic groups disadvantaged by this type of system. The former would appear to be more likely to subscribe to the role orientations of trustee and inventor, and the

latter to the role orientations of delegate and broker or tribune. Those for whom civic politics is a road to political office at a higher level will presumably be less content with a "rubber stamp" role for the council in an executive-dominated system, if they want to earn a reputation which would be useful to them in other electoral contests. These are some of the considerations that come to mind when one considers the possible effect on role perception of the values and interests developed on the road to public office. These are examined more closely in the next chapter.

Given the possible influence of the foregoing on role perception, we must now move to consider certain factors which may prevent the performance of a role in this emergent form.

As the process of governing a large city becomes more complex, one can expect a greater part to be played by professional administrators, with a subsequent devaluation of the role allotted to those with "lay education." The implications of this possibility are investigated in Chapter VII.

Conflict may develop between the mayor and aldermen if all are trying to pursue the inventor role. The mayor's position is more vulnerable at the polls, because it is more visible; and one can expect that the mayor would want to assume a position of leadership in planning and develop-

ment.

Through this type of analysis it can be seen that
the expectations (prescriptive and empirical) that the
incumbents of the positions of alderman, commissioner, and
mayor entertain for themselves and each other may serve to
modify the roles prescribed on the system level.[10] Further
analysis shows where difficulties may arise in translating
role perception into role behavior.

It is more difficult to hypothesize and measure the
effects of individual personality differences on role
perception, except in so far as they relate to the kinds
of factors already considered. In any case, a study of
role perception would tap the effect of these differences
through their effects on role perception. If one were
interested in the content of roles and the implications
of role conflict for group and system performance, rather
than tracing in detail the development of role perception,
this would suffice.

We have defined "role" in this study as "a set of
expectations applied to the incumbent of a particular
position," and have tried to show where these expectations

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[10]It should be noted that this chapter has been using
as "role prescription on the system level" relevant aspects
of the rationale for this particular form of government given
in the literature on local government. It is conceivable
that this is not all that cultural prescription entails, but
it does serve as a frame of reference for a study of the
role perceptions of individuals.

come from: from the society, from the group (i.e.,
occupants of similar and counter positions), and from
the individual occupying the position. We have also
tried to demonstrate that a role, constructed empirically
in this manner, serves to tap the frame of reference an
individual brings to bear when carrying out the functions
associated with his position. With regard to overt behavior,
it should be stressed that role perception is a frame of
reference, and there is no _a priori_ reason to expect a
deterministic relationship with overt behavior, given
conflicting expectations and various kinds of stress sit-
uations. Knowledge of an individual's role perception,
however, should aid in predicting and explaining selective
reception of cues from the environment.

CHAPTER IV

RECRUITMENT AND ORIENTATIONS

We have already pointed out a number of times that
the literature on local government makes several suggestions
about the probable characteristics of a nonpartisan, com-
missioner-council system with at-large elections. This
literature also provides clues about the type of people we
might expect to occupy elected positions in this type of
system. The examination of the careers and goals of such
people is the exercise undertaken in this chapter.

If the hypotheses about this system presented in
Chapter III are valid, we should expect to find a dis-
tinctive group of people whose main aim is to promote the
growth and development of their city rather than to carve
out a career for themselves in professional politics. The
job of alderman in this type of city is a part-time one,
well suited to combination with a business career in
not making excessive demands on time. The path into
active politics for these people should begin and end
with the city.

These hypotheses are reinforced by certain patterns
traced by Harold Kaplan,[1] in contrasting Canadian local

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[1]Harold Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making in

politics with that of the United States. He maintains that
politics at the local level in the United States is char-
acterized by the existence of a "broker-leadership" role
for elected representatives, in a setting in which a major
policy-making role is played by private interest groups.
Policy-making becomes a way of minimizing discontent rather
than of implementing a program, as politicians delay de-
cisions until the alighment of groups is clear, then make
a decision compromising the demands of these groups with
due regard paid to their power positions.

By way of contrast Canada (represented by Toronto)
is characterized, according to Kaplan, by "executive-
centered" decision-making which gives administrators a
dominant role in initiating, defining, and lobbying for
certain policies. Private groups play a minor part and
may even feel pressure is unethical. Low pressure,
low conflict policy-making in Toronto is reinforced by
(1) the failure of elections to produce governing factions
on council, (2) the failure of interest groups to get
involved in elections, and (3) the secure position of
incumbents seeking re-election.[2]

Without denigrating the value of Kaplan's article,
we should be careful in accepting his hypotheses given the

Metropolitan Toronto," Canadian Journal of Economics and
Political Science, 31 (November 1965), 538-551.

[2]Ibid., p. 543.

fact that little empirical research has been done along
these lines in Canada and that the pattern he associates
with the U.S. is by no means the only one for which evi-
dence exists.[3] Presumably nonpartisan cities with city-
manager government in the U.S. would display some of the
characteristics cited for Canada.[4]

However, if Kaplan is right and municipal politics
is a waste of time for professional politicians who would
presumably want greater exposure to the public than they
could get playing a minor part, and want to use municipal
office as a channel to higher office, we should find evi-
dence for this in the reasons people give for seeking of-
fice, and their plans, if any, for seeking office at the
provincial or federal levels of government.

In order to answer questions such as these, respon-
dents were asked to name the source of their political
interest, their reasons for becoming active themselves,
and the reasons they chose the positions they did.[5]

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[3]See for example, Charles Adrian, "Leadership and
Decision-Making in Manager Cities: A Study of Three
Communities," Public Administration Review, 18 (Summer 1958),
208-213.

[4]See for example Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 151-
186; Gladys M. Kammerer, Charles D. Ferris, John M. DeGrove,
and Alfred B. Clubok, City Managers in Politics (Gainesville,
Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962), pp. 8-9, 87ff.;
and Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political
Ethos and the Structure of Local Government," American Pol-
itical Science Review, 60 (September 1966), 306-308.

[5]See Appendix, Question 6, (a) (b) and (c).

Before examining the results, a word of caution about interpretation is in order. The question about source of political interest is susceptible to response errors because of memory lapses, ambiguity in belief as to what would constitute "being interested in politics," and the temptation to claim that one has always been interested in politics. However, we need not rely on this one question for our discussion. The reasons given for the decision to become active in politics are less susceptible to errors of memory, but rationalization after the fact is still possible. This question, however, and the subsequent one (about choice of office) should provide clues as to whether municipal politics attracts the less politically ambitious.

As expected, most of the respondents claimed to have been interested in politics since childhood (Table 2); how-

TABLE 2

TIME OF INITIAL INTEREST IN POLITICS
FOR MAYORS AND ALDERMEN

	Childhood	Adulthood
Mayors	2	1
Aldermen	9	6
Total	11	7

ever, some of the respondents cited justification for
their statements which indicates that early interest in
politics may have been important in shaping their orienta-
tions towards politics.

> I was always interested in organization and ad-
> ministration. I was taught in the home that
> participation in civic affairs was a duty com-
> parable to church duty.

> In 1934, when I was eight years old. At that
> time Social Credit was coming in. My father was
> active in the U.F.A. [United Farmers of Alberta].
> At that time everyone in the country was active.
> They'd have meetings followed by a dance.

> My Dad was interested in politics. I grew up in
> the debate of politics. Staunch Liberals they
> were. Sometimes you didn't even talk to Con-
> servatives.

There appeared to be a slight tendency for the
older respondents to claim an interest in politics since
childhood, perhaps because of memory lapses (Table 2).
Those older than 55, the approximate median age for the
group, appear to be more likely to claim an interest in
politics since childhood, while those younger than 55 are
less likely to make this claim. The relationship is only
suggestive, however, given the number in the 35-44 age group
claiming to have first become interested in politics in
childhood.

Whether those who claimed to have become politically
interested in later life missed the kind of childhood re-
ferred to or just discounted its importance was impossible
to tell. Political interest for them was often attributed

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGE AND TIME
OF INTEREST IN POLITICS

Age	Time of Interest	
	Childhood	Adulthood
Over 65	3	1
55-64	3	2
45-54	1	1
35-44	4	1
Under 35	0	2
Total	11	7

to specific experiences later in life:

> Aside from the usual interest most people get
> just from living in the community, what sparked
> me into the ring was. John Kennedy.

> Eight years ago, in 1959, I was approached by
> the [a political party] to run in _____. I
> got my deposit back. Only two others got theirs.
> I never sought any position, but I was persuaded
> to run.

It is difficult to decide how to evaluate the

effect of these two types of experience (childhood or

adulthood). A more thorough study of political sociali-

zation would presumably be able to discover these effects

and their relative strengths. This study is more concerned

with what people attribute their political interest to

rather than with tracing the development of this interest.

However, there appears to be some evidence for be-

lieving that the two sources of political interest may produce different results. It appears from Tables 4 and 5 that half of those claiming to have been interested in politics since childhood have a weak or no party attachment, whereas a majority of those who were not interested in politics until adulthood are more likely to claim a strong or fairly strong party attachment. The significance of

TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIME OF INTEREST
IN POLITICS AND STRENGTH OF
PARTY ATTACHMENT[a]

Party Attachment	Time of Interest	
	Childhood	Adulthood
Very strong	5	2
Fairly strong	0	3
Weak	3	1
None	2	1
No answer	1	0
Total	11	7

[a]Mayors and aldermen combined.

these tables should not be overdrawn, but it is possible that the adoption of a party attachment could be a substitute for a "politicized" childhood in preparing an individual to seek public office. It is equally plausible that the development of a strong party identification merely leads one to discount the influence of childhood on

political orientations, but the large number citing child-

hood as the time of political interest and also claiming

strong or fairly strong party attachments may lead one

to discount this possibility.

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TIME OF INTEREST IN POLITICS
AND STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACHMENT FOR
MAYORS AND ALDERMEN[a]

Party Attachment	Time of Interest			
	Childhood		Adulthood	
	M[b]	A[c]	M	A
Very strong or fairly strong	1	4	1	4
Weak or none	1	4	0	2
Total	2	8	1	6

[a]Those with no answer omitted.　[b]Mayor.　[c]Alderman.

This record of political socialization, incomplete

as it is, being volunteered, leaves unanswered the

question of whether the backgrounds of these people prepared

them for political office more than other people, or

whether their backgrounds differentiate them from those

holding political office on the provincial or federal level.

However, a study by Kornberg and Thomas of leaders in

the Canadian House of Commons and the U.S. Congress presents

evidence to show that a majority of the leaders in the

Canadian House claimed to have become interested in politics through childhood experiences.[6] A study of Members of Parliament between 1867 and 1945, by Norman Ward, revealed that a fairly steady one-third of the members had experience in local government before going to Ottawa.[7] In the absence of further evidence, we must conclude that the political socialization experiences of aldermen are not substantially different from those of politicians on other levels.

If we pursue the answers to the next two "political interest" questions,[8] we find evidence to suggest that many aldermen did not actively seek council positions, but were persuaded to run, and have no political ambitions beyond the local level. Instead they see council service as an extension of their general service to the community.

Respondents were classified as to their routes into active politics by their answers to question 6(c): "How did it come about that you ran for alderman?"[9] If they mentioned being active in service clubs, the Chamber of

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[6]Allan Kornberg and Norman Thomas, "The Political Socialization of National Legislative Elites in the United States and Canada," Journal of Politics, 27 (November 1965), 768.

[7]Norman Ward, The Canadian House of Commons: Representation, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 123.

[8]See Appendix, questions 6(b) and 6(c).

[9]Two of the three mayors were aldermen before becoming mayor. The question was modified slightly for the mayor who had no previous aldermanic experience.

Commerce, the Jaycees, community leagues, or similar

groups they were classified as "community-service"

types. If they maintained that their campaigns for local

office were part of activity in political parties, and that

this was enough to make them seek local office, they were

classified as "party-route" types. Two respondents entered

politics at the urging of their labor unions and were

classified as "union-route" types (Table 6).

TABLE 6

ROUTE INTO POLITICS FOR
MAYORS AND ALDERMEN

Respondents	Route into Politics		
	Community Service	Party Route	Labor Union
Mayors	2	0	1
Aldermen	11	4	1
Total	13	4	2

As can be seen from the table, most of the respondents

were active in community affairs before running for office.

Typical responses were as follows:

> I was persuaded by friends to go into politics.
> I was active in many fields and held office in
> associations and served on many public boards,
> for example the hospital board and boards in
> education and civic affairs.

> I got into municipal politics by accident. I
> revived interest in my community league . . .
> by pointing out to people that they had to take
> responsibility. The next Spring a delegation
> came asking me to run for council I
> refused. They asked me why I didn't practice
> what I preached. I finally agreed to run be-
> lieving I wouldn't be elected, but I was.

Only four respondents could be said to have had significant political party experience before entering municipal politics. Their answers differ significantly, as the example attests:

> I never separated politics in the civic, pro-
> vincial, and federal fields. It's all part of
> the same process. [I ran for office because] it
> was the expected way to behave; it was part of
> my life.

Ten of the thirteen people who were active in community service activities before running for office indicated that they had not sought their positions themselves, but were persuaded to run by "friends and and associates." As one put it:

> I was approached by the Better Civic Government
> Committee. They wanted [someone] who was fair-
> ly well-known in the community. I knew quite a
> few of these people from my work in the United
> Community Fund.

Two "community-service" types claimed that "circumstances" allowed them to run for office, in one case the development of a successful business which no longer needed constant personal attention, and in the other, retirement after the problem of earning a living was no longer present. Only one mentioned making the decision to run on his own. Table 7 summarizes the factors in-

fluencing the choice of position.

TABLE 7

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROUTE INTO POLITICS
AND FACTORS INFLUENCING
POSITION CHOICE

Factors Influencing Position Choice	Route into Politics					
	Community Service M[a] A[b]		Party Route M A		Labor Union M A	
Friends & associates	2	7	0	0	0	0 (9)
Membership in slate-making group	0	1	0	0	0	0 (1)
All elected positions of equivalent interest	0	0	0	2	0	0 (2)
Circumstances	0	2	0	2	1	0 (5)
Interest group membership	0	0	0	0	0	1 (1)
Total	2	10	0	4	1	1

[a]Mayor.   [b]Alderman.

Two of the four active in political parties before entering civic politics mentioned deciding on their own to run because the civic positions were of equal interest to them and that they had had the opportunity to run.

It is difficult to say of those mentioning "cir-

cumstances" whether they would have run had circumstances
been different. One ran because he was available when
an association he belonged to decided to run someone as
part of a political education program. A second, mentioned
above, had retired after an active career in business and
community affairs, and was "looking for something to do."
These two both followed the community service route into
local politics.

Of the two party-route types mentioning that circum-
stances prompted them to run, one ran after being instru-
mental in forcing a judicial inquiry into the conduct of
the mayor. This seems to have given him a certain amount
of fame which could probably only be useful for local
political credit. The other would undoubtedly have run
for office at some level of government, but chose the
local level because of the restrictions imposed by a
young family.

We have seen that the majority of respondents do not
seem to have had much preparation for their positions through
participation in political parties or other groups which
we might normally associate with recruitment into politics.
The majority do not even admit to having actively canvassed
for nomination to the office they hold (a nomination which
requires only the owning of property in the city and the
signatures of two voters who need not even be property
owners). All this seems to be in keeping with the thesis

that a low key, nonpartisan system will attract the less
politically ambitious.[10] If we add to this hypothesis one
stating that aldermen in such a system will be more locally-
oriented and less likely to seek office at the provincial
or federal level, because those levels support a different
kind of politics, we would expect that the community-
service types would be more likely to seek re-election
locally and less likely to seek positions at other levels
of government.

Looking at Table 8, we can see that most incumbents
answering the question about re-election plans[11] planned
to seek re-election. Only one, because of "pressures of
business," said he would not run again.

TABLE 8

RE-ELECTION PLANS FOR INCUMBENT
MAYOR AND ALDERMEN[a]

Yes	No	Undecided	No Answer
6	1	2	3

[a]The mayor is not shown separately to honor a pledge
of anonymity.

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[10]We must bear in mind the possibility that there may
be little difference between these respondents and those
interviewed by Kornberg and Thomas (see above, pp. 50-51).
However, the data and theory in this study suggest that
those with local experience leading to parliamentary ex-
perience will represent a minority in city councils.

[11]See Appendix, question 6(e).

Why do so many seek re-election when the majority did not actively solicit nomination in the first place? If the position carries little political weight, it may be that the rewards such as prestige associated with the job, just as with "community service," the main route into municipal politics, is sufficient, and that the position allows them to do the same kinds of things--welfare work, business development, promotion, etc. Support for this hypothesis is offered in Table 9, when we look at plans to seek election at the provincial or federal levels, for which active participation in a political party or party nomination is virtually a necessary condition for success.

TABLE 9

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RE-ELECTION PLANS AND AMBITIONS
FOR OFFICE BEYOND THE LOCAL LEVEL FOR
INCUMBENT MAYOR AND ALDERMEN[a]

Ambitions Beyond Local Level?	Re-Election Plans				
	Yes	No	Un-decided	No Answer	Total
None	3	1	0	0	4
Yes	3	0	2	1	6
Undecided	1	0	0	0	1
No Answer	0	0	0	2	2

[a]The mayor is not shown separately to honor a pledge of anonymity.

It appears from the table that the two who were undecided as to their local plans were likely so because of their plans to seek election at another level. The number expressing both local ambitions and ambitions to go beyond the local level diminishes in significance when we realize that all three are freshmen aldermen. Two of them followed the party route into civic politics and were likely seeking more experience and publicity to aid them later on.

The distinction between those with purely local ambitions and those possibly using civic politics as a "stepping stone" becomes clearer if one looks at the strength of party attachment of those with or without ambitions for political office at another level.(Table 10).

TABLE 10

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROVINCIAL OR FEDERAL AMBITIONS
AND STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACHMENT FOR INCUMBENT
MAYOR AND ALDERMEN[a]

Provincial or Federal Ambitions	Party Attachment				
	Very Strong	Fairly Strong	Weak	None	Total
Yes	4	2	0	0	6
No	0	0	3	3	6

[a]Those with no answer omitted. The mayor is not shown separately in order to honor a pledge of anonymity.

As can be readily seem from Table 10, no one
without a strong or fairly strong attachment to a pol-
itical party plans to seek office provincially or federally,
but this does not prevent them from seeking local office.
We might expect that the development of a party attachment
would be a prerequisite for office-seeking provincially
or federally, but it is significant that those with only
local ambitions do not have such an attachment.

The strength of party attachment also appears to
bear a relationship to the route into civic politics.
As can be seen from Tables 11 and 12, a majority of those

TABLE 11

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROUTE INTO CIVIC POLITICS
AND STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACHMENT FOR ALL
MAYORS AND ALDERMEN

Route into Politics	Party Attachment									
	Very Strong M[a] A[b]		Fairly Strong M A		Weak M A		None M A		No Answer M A		Total
Community service	1	1	0	2	1	3	0	3	0	1	12
Party route	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Labor union	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

[a]Mayor.   [b]Alderman.

following the community-service route have a weak or no attachment to a political party. This finding is particularly strong for the present incumbents.

TABLE 12

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROUTE INTO CIVIC POLITICS
AND STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACHMENT FOR
INCUMBENT MAYOR AND ALDERMEN[a]

Route into Politics	Party Attachment					
	Very Strong	Fairly Strong	Weak	None	No Answer	Total
Community service	1	1	3	3	1	9
Party route	3	1	0	0	0	4
Labor union	0	0	0	0	0	0

[a]Mayor not shown separately to honor a pledge of anonymity.

The findings presented in this chapter give some support for the hypothesis that a number of council members in cities such as Edmonton with nonpartisanship, at-large elections and a middle-class value system will be more oriented to the part of the job of alderman we have called "community service" than to the political rewards (acquisition of a position enabling one to gain provincial recognition) that can be secured through office holding. In the absence of comparative data, however,

this does not constitute proof that the "system" is responsible.

The respondents thus seem to fall into two different groups: those who have no desire to seek office at a higher level, but do wish to run for local office again; and those for whom local office is possibly a prelude to a bid for office provincially or federally. That these two groups are fairly distinct is demonstrated by a finding that only those who have a strong or fairly strong party attachment plan to seek office at another level of government. The route into politics for these people is also related to these groupings. Those with a record of "community service" preceding election to city council (except for those with a strong or fairly strong party attachment) are those who have no ambitions beyond the local level. Those who had significant party experience before running for council and those community-service types with strong or fairly strong party attachments do not plan to remain in local politics.

What do these findings imply for "role perception"? It is a cardinal assumption of role theory that holders of certain positions will acquire a characteristic set of values associated with that position through some sort of "role socialization" process. It would seem that part of that process would include the values and goals acquired through experiences prior to the holding of a council seat.

It has already been suggested (Chapter III) that different recruitment experiences prior to entry into municipal politics (community service, party or labor union) may be associated with different perceptions of the function of the alderman, and perceptions of his relationship to others in the decision-making structure. These possibilities are investigated, respectively, in Chapters V and VII.

We have found, however, that municipal politicians appear to fall into two groups distinguishable by their level of political-career aspirations and party attachment. If the expectations for the alderman in this type of system are as outlined in previous chapters, we would expect to find a greater agreement with them on the part of aldermen with purely local orientations.

CHAPTER V

ROLE PERCEPTION

We now come to the point where we must consider what the respondents feel their function, duties and responsibilities are by virtue of their holding a certain office in a particular kind of political system. In the context of Chapter II these were called the "expectations" associated with the "role of alderman," and their "perception" of these expectations was called "role perception." It should be stressed again that although there are a number of influences on this perception (outlined theoretically in Chapters II and III), the small-scale interview approach can only reveal the resultant of these influences and unfortunately does not constitute, logically, verification of their existence.

From what has gone before one can speculate on what will be found in the way of "role perception." The functions of an alderman in this system are primarily of the "adaptive" variety. He must approve zoning and development plans, capital works proposals, and numerous other by-laws associated with traffic, zoning and licensing. There are no clear-cut formal boundaries to his position, although it is assumed he will stop short of involvement

in day-to-day administration. The alderman attends meetings twice a month, at which time he "makes policy" which involves mainly consideration of reports and recommendations supplied by the commissioners and the mayor.

It may be that aldermen do not have a clearly articulated view of what their role is, given its part-time nature and, as Kaplan suggests, the lack of a significant part to play in civic government. If their role demands little, they will presumably have little incentive to approach it creatively or carefully, clarifying their positions to themselves.

However, as has been stated a number of times previously, this study is probing role perception on the individual level, and a role that may be objectively insignificant may have great importance to the individual embracing it.

Scanning the responses for goals sought by these people, it becomes apparent that most, especially the "community-service" types, are concerned only with community problems and not with securing satisfaction for the demands of particular groups, or with gaining experience and building a reputation which would help them in elections at another level. Representative responses of this type were:

> I think you could call it an intention to contribute in some way to the community.

Even as a young child I was interested in the
church and the community.

Often the responses were couched in general terms
such as this, but two in particular described in more detail
their rationale for seeking office:

People at that time were dissatisfied with the
garbage collection of the city. I had to pre-
pare a garbage collection report to present to
council. At that time most of the council were
older people who had been there for some time.
Any new idea presented by a younger person was
automatically taboo. They laughed at me. How-
ever, people were dissatisfied and council's
reaction brought me to the attention of the
public. I was forced to run for council.

It was based on my being interested in the af-
fairs of the [an ethnic group]. I was asked
to join the Better Civic Government Association
. . . . I'd served [the ethnic group] pretty
well.

The last response in particular indicates how com-
munity service and the role of alderman in a city of this
nature complement each other.

Only one respondent specifically mentioned running
as the spokesman of a particular group:

It became apparent that there needed to be
someone to take more interest in legislation
at all levels. At that time workers were not
represented personally on city council or in
the provincial government. We canvassed the
membership to see who would run for council.
I finally had to put up or shut up.

Wahlke et al. feel that role perceptions are probab-
ly related to the legislator's perception of the power
pattern of the political system and the kinds of functions
which the legislature is called upon to perform.

> For instance, in a party disciplined legislature
> the individual legislator is unlikely to find much
> room for independence or inventiveness; the pure-
> ly routine aspects of his job probably loom
> large in his legislative role orientations. In
> a legislature particularly exposed to the pulls
> and pressures of interest groups, role orientations
> are likely to derive from the need to arbitrate,
> compromise, and integrate group conflicts. In a
> legislature subservient to the whims and wishes
> of the electorate, the spokesman function is
> likely to be accentuated in legislative role
> orientations. In a legislature which enjoys
> relatively great independence from the executive,
> legislative role orientations may stress the
> creative, policy-making aspects of the job.[1]

Implicit in this statement is an assumption that

legislators will feel that they should behave in a cer-

tain manner because they perceive certain individuals

or groups who possess sanctions which they can exercise

to punish deviance. In the paragraph just quoted,

such sanctions could be party control over nominations,

group voting power, the voting power of an informed, aroused

electorate, and executive control over patronage and per-

quisites.

None of these sanctions appears to exist in Edmonton,

if the re-election of incumbents can be taken as some evi-

dence for this. Only three incumbents have been defeated

in bids for re-election during the last twenty years--on

widely separated occasions. Nomination by the Better Civic

Government Committee, the most successful as a group, does

not guarantee election. In the most recent election

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[1] The Legislative System, pp. 247-248.

(October 1966), seven out of twelve sponsored by this group (the only group to run a full slate) were elected, but three were incumbents and another had sat previously. The only incumbent defeated since 1955 was a nominee of this group. Of course one could maintain that all this constitutes evidence that deviance did not occur; however, the internal troubles of the Better Civic Government Association presented in Chapter I, and the success of former BCGC candidates as independents makes this unlikely. Also, as is pointed out in Chapter VI, respondents are adamant in maintaining that no particular orthodoxy is enforced by groups such as this. A general kind of orthodoxy may be ensured, however, by the nomination of "right-thinking" people. This is only insurance, however, and for reasons already given probably does not constitute much of a sanction.

It would appear to be difficult to marshal group support as a sanction in at-large elections just as it is difficult to associate any particular policy decision with a particular alderman or group of aldermen. The mayor is more visible, but seems to be no more vulnerable. No incumbent mayor has been defeated during at least the past twenty years.

There does not appear to be much opportunity for patronage dispensing, removing this as a sanction for the executive. One source of influence the executive may

have over the aldermen is control over the administration
of the city, with an accompanying advantage in information
sources, as well as control over the major source of policy
proposals and recommendations,but this is not a sanction.

It is not surprising then that the majority of
respondents, when asked "What are the most important
things you should do in your role as alderman?"[2] replied
in "creative" terms of the purpose of the job and pre-
requisites for it, rather than in terms of placating
interest groups or representing particular sections of
the city. Very often the respondent would mention his
role as a "policy-maker" and not elaborate.

One response is presented in full here as summarizing
the attitudes of the interviewees towards their roles:

> The role of the alderman is as a policy-maker,
> to make policy and see it carried out. It is
> not his job to interfere in administration. Some
> aldermen want to "hand bricks and lay them too."
>   What an alderman should do varies with the
> type of city he is in. In an expanding, growing
> city like Edmonton, he must be sensitive to
> what is going on in city planning. In a static
> city this is unimportant. He must direct growth
> on proper scientific lines. He has an important
> role in providing necessary cultural, recreational,
> and educational facilities.

Almost all respondents added to these sentiments
the requirement that the alderman keep informed and base
his decisions on the "best available information." This
is not surprising given the importance attached to a single

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[2]See Appendix, question 10.

vote in a voting body of thirteen (twelve aldermen and
the mayor) and the lack of formal direction in voting
provided by parties in other settings. It is perhaps for
this reason that the respondents feel that they have a
more important role than the one Kaplan credits them with.
This statement of "role perception" constitutes indirect
evidence that the primary concern of policy-makers is
the quality of information they receive, and not the
demands of particular groups.

Only two aldermen failed to see their roles in
these terms. One was concerned with threatened encroach-
ment by the provincial government on local autonomy. In
other respects he did not differ from the majority of alder-
men. The other perceived herself as the champion of the
poor. "The poor have no one to represent them. When
a poor man tells a lie it's because he's afraid to tell
the truth."

The latter respondent was the only one whose role
perception appeared to be clearly at odds with the "inventor"
role predicted for this type of system. The existence of
such a "tribune" role is not surprising, however, when one
considers the dislocations caused by zoning changes and
city planning on a large scale, and the concomitant anon-
ymity of the city administration, particularly to the less
well-educated. This alderman gave examples of numerous
calls and letters received from those claiming abrupt or

arbitrary treatment at the hands of civic officials:

> People always come to me for help. I'm always
> ready to take up their complaints. I always
> win too. Not for myself, but for these people.
> The majority of the people don't know where to
> turn.

The expected differences in role perception related to route into politics and/or party attachment failed to materialize,[3]perhaps because role perception in this case is related closely to the functions the city is called upon to perform.[4] What appears to be largely a consensus among aldermen, despite differences in recruitment experiences, may be a result of similar perceptions of the "power pattern" of the political system. Perceptions of the context of aldermanic activity are treated in Chapter VI.

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[3]In a recent article, Kenneth Prewitt, Heinz Eulau, and Betty H. Zisk give support for this finding in a study of state legislators and city councilmen. See "Political Socialization and Political Roles," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30 (Winter 1966-67), 578-582.

[4]Of course, one could argue that the city performs these functions because aldermen perceive their roles this way, but it seems more plausible that both are the resultant of a more complex social process than we can examine here.

CHAPTER VI

PERCEPTIONS OF PARTISANSHIP AND

INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITY

Up to this point we have been considering recruit-
ment, orientations and role perceptions of aldermen and
mayors and analyzing them in the context of a nonpartisan,
at-large electoral system, in which we expect a dominant
part to be played by administrators and a small part by
political parties and organized groups. This chapter pre-
sents the perceptions of people involved in this type of
system of the context in which they act.

Much has been written about nonpartisan politics in
the context of local government and the values and
institutions which are alleged to be associated with it.
Much of this has been summarized in preceding chapters.
Nonpartisanship is held to be part of the "public-regarding"
ethos which, with the "private-regarding" ethos, symbolizes
two opposing philosophies of local government and the
public interest.

> The first, which derives from the middle class
> ethos, favors what the municipal reform movement
> has always defined as "good government"--namely
> efficiency, impartiality, honesty, planning,
> strong executives, no favoritism, model legal
> codes . . . . The other conception of the
> public interest (one never explicitly formulated

as such, but one all the same) derives from the
"immigrant ethos." This is the conception of
those people who identify with the ward or
neighborhood rather than "the city as a whole,"
who look to politicians for "help" or "favors,"
. . . and who are far less interested in the
efficiency, impartiality and honesty of local
government than in its readiness to confer
material benefits of one sort or another upon
them.[1]

The institutional correlates of the "public-re-
garding" ethos are held to be the nonpartisan ballot,

city manager plan, and the election of aldermen at-large

or from large districts. The "private-regarding" ethos

favors mayors, partisan ballots, and the election of

aldermen from wards, preferably small ones.[2]

Wolfinger and Field, in the article from which

the quotation is taken, investigated these propositions for

the United States by relating the percentage foreign stock

in the three hundred largest cities to the alleged existence

of the middle class and immigrant ethos. Their substantive

findings are not our concern here, but they did find that

regional variations made most of the claims about the

private-regarding politics of immigrant groups very ten-

uous. What is important for the purposes of this study

is the mention of the "ideology of good government" and

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[1]Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, quoted in Ray-
mond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos
and the Structure of Local Government," American Political
Science Review, 60 (September 1966), 306.

[2]Wolfinger and Osgood, loc. cit., 307.

the fact that its institutional requirements tend to be found together, especially in the West. The remaining cities, however, did not exhibit pure private-regarding forms of government, making the distinction less useful for comparative purposes. If there is an "ideology of good government," however, the respondents in this study may subscribe to it, making it an important element in their role perception.

This ideology is presented here as it has been expressed in the United States where the issues associated with it have been debated for many years, because non-partisan ballots, the manager plan, and at-large elections were adopted as reform measures promoted by a national organization (National Municipal League). In Canada it seems that nonpartisanship.has rarely been much of an issue, with nonpartisan ballots being almost universal in municipal elections, but not prescribed by law. Whether political parties exclude themselves is another matter, but overt participation by them is also rare.

Because the respondents in this study differ considerably with regard to strength of party attachment and partisan experience, it should be interesting to investigate their perceptions of the nonpartisan local setting with its at-large elections and an administrative system close to the manager plan in operation and intent. To this end, respondents were asked:

> Our system of government has been described as
> nonpartisan because political parties don't
> field candidates in elections. How do you feel
> about this type of system? Why is that?[3]

If the threat of political parties creeping into local politics was a salient concern in nonpartisan Edmonton (or considered to be undesirable), one would expect to see two opposing groups differentiated on the basis of a commitment or lack of commitment to a political party. This appears not to be the case. The respondents were asked to assess the nonpartisan system, but most prefaced their assessment with a judgment of whether the system was truly nonpartisan or not. With one exception, those who thought that the system was nonpartisan thought it was better that way. One-third of the group (six) thought that the term 'nonpartisan' was a misnomer.

If we look at Table 13,[4] it appears that those who followed the community-service route are more strongly in favor of this type of system. Those following the party route were proportionately more likely to claim that the system was actually partisan, although the numbers here are too small for confident generalization. However, if we break down the group by strength of party attachment, a

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[3]See Appendix, question 21.

[4]Although both mayors and aldermen in this system are basically inventors, in this and subsequent tables they are shown separately, in order not to disguise differences if they exist. Important differences are noted when they appear.

TABLE 13

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROUTE INTO POLITICS AND
COMMENT ON NONPARTISAN SYSTEM

Route into Politics	Comment						Total
	Good M[a] A[b]		Bad M A		Not True M A		
Community service	2	6	0	1	0	3	12
Party route	0	2	0	0	0	2	4
Labor union	1	1	0	0	0	0	2

[a]Mayor.   [b]Alderman.

more reliable indicator of partisan feelings, we find
(Table 14) that those with very strong or fairly strong
party attachments are about as likely (7:3) to favor
nonpartisan local government as those with weak or no
party attachments (5:2).

An even more reliable indicator of partisan ex-
perience, participation in political parties before
running for council, produced similar results (Table 15).
There was no difference in perceptions of, or preferences
for, nonpartisanship between those active and those not
active in political parties.

That even those with strong or fairly strong party
attachments subscribed to the philosophy of nonpartisanship
is suggested by Table 16. The largest group of respond-

TABLE 14

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMENT ON NONPARTISAN
SYSTEM AND STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACH-
MENT[a]

Party Attachment	Comment						
	Good		Bad		Not True		Total
	M[b]	A[c]	M	A	M	A	
Very strong or fairly strong	2	5	0	0	0	3	10
Weak or none	1	4	0	1	0	1	7

[a]"No answer" omitted.　　[b]Mayor.　　[c]Alderman.

TABLE 15

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMENT ON NONPARTISAN SYSTEM
AND PARTY ACTIVITY PRIOR TO COUNCIL

Party Activity?[a]	Comment						
	Good		Bad		Not True		Total
	M[b]	.A[c]	M	A	M	A	
No	0	5	0	1	0	2	8
Yes	2	3	0	0	0	3	8
No Answer	1	1	0	0	0	0	2

[a]As measured by the holding of executive positions in political parties or running for partisan office.

[b]Mayor.　　[c]Alderman.

ents made the claim that problems on the civic level were
of a different nature than at the provincial and federal
levels. "There's no clash of ideologies; cities provide
mainly services" was a representative response.

TABLE 16

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY ATTACHMENT AND RATIONALE
FOR NONPARTISAN SYSTEM[a]

Rationale	Attachment				
	Strong or Fairly Strong		Weak or None		Total
	M[b]	A[c]	M	A	
Different nature of problems on civic level	1	3	0	2	6
Better results with nonpartisanship	1	1	0	1	3
Problems with senior government if partisan	0	2	1	1	4

[a]Those with "no answer" or feeling that the system is
partisan are omitted.

[b]Mayor.   [c]Alderman.

It seems that the "philosophy of nonpartisanship" has
passed a fairly crucial test here because the majority of
those with a very strong party attachment subscribe to it.
A purely pragmatic acceptance of nonpartisanship would seem
to be implied by the claim that partisan local government

would present problems in dealing with the senior government, if a different political party were in power provincially. This is the second largest category of responses, but it is not overwhelmingly subscribed to by any particular group.

The belief that "better results" can be obtained with nonpartisan government would seem to fall somewhere between the pragmatic and philosophical justifications. Responses such as "you'd have to have a party policy on everything" and "you get better results with free agents" were entered here. It does seem, however, that those who appear to accept partisan politics on other levels, as evidenced by the strength of their party attachments, do tend to subscribe to the ideology of nonpartisan local government. It also appears that these people are willing to de-emphasize their party attachments in order to take part in local government. It is debatable whether they do this because of a genuine belief in the different nature of local government (which is what this writer assumes given the approach used in the study), or because they feel advertisement of their partisan connections would harm them in local elections.

Two respondents, while claiming that the existing system was nonpartisan, did not feel that it was necessarily better that way. One thought that party government would be better because a greater collective experience

could be brought to bear on problems. The other thought
that party discipline would be required with a larger
council (which would become necessary as the city grew)
in order to get things done. Interestingly enough, both
these respondents claimed to have weak party attachments,
perhaps because their ambitions have been only for local
office. In any case, this presents further support for
the finding that preference for nonpartisanship does not
appear to be related to party attachment.

Those who thought the system was in fact partisan
(six) were a mixed group. Of the five in this group who
elaborated their position, two said "everything is par-
tisan" because every issue has a "left" or "right" solu-
tion. Another thought that groups with vested interests
involved in nomination qualified the system as partisan.
Only two claimed that regular political parties made
sure that their members ran. One respondent stated blunt-
ly: "They'll run someone even if he's a dummy. They don't
want to leave a vacuum." Both those with or without party
attachments were evenly represented among those who thought
the system was partisan.

To ensure that those feeling the system was non-
partisan were not just answering in formal terms because
party labels do not appear on the ballot, and parties do
not publicly endorse candidates, they were asked whether
they thought "slate-making" groups fulfilled some of the

same functions as parties.[5] As can be seem from Table

17, a majority feel that civic groups do not perform the

same functions as parties. The most popular response was

that these groups "only nominate candidates" and present

no policy nor make any attempt to control voting.

TABLE 17

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMENT ON NONPARTISANSHIP AND
ATTITUDE TOWARD CIVIC GROUPS

Comment on Nonpartisanship	Civic Groups Party-Like?				Total
	Yes M[a] A[b]		No M A		
Good	1	2	2	7	12
Bad	0	0	0	1	1
Not True	0	3	0	2	5

[a]Mayor.   [b]Alderman.

However, a number who thought that the system was

nonpartisan felt that civic groups were party-like, and

a few who thought that the system was partisan denied that

it was because of these groups. From the first category

came these two responses:

> They do [act as parties] in this sense. A political party is really a pressure group. These other little groups can become pressure groups too.

[5]See Appendix, question 22.

> The smack of partisanship is bound to exist after
> the election. If you're elected because of the
> support of nine people, after you're elected
> you're a human being. You're bound to look
> upon them with kindlier eyes. Not that you're
> going to do anything wrong. If you're presented
> with two policies of equal merit and your friends
> favor one of them . . . ?

Most of the respondents described these civic groups as nominators or sources of financial support. This was the view of the two respondents who felt civic groups were not "party-like" even though the system was partisan. Most appeared to view groups in the same way, but disagreed as to whether their activity could be defined as "party-like."

Again, however, two respondents[6] maintained that the groups were in fact controlled by party members. One made this very clear:

> They plug up the holes so people who want to
> do things can't get on. They keep council
> deliberately weak. A few years ago the Civic
> Government Association had a formula allow-
> ing six Liberals, two or three Conservatives,
> and, depending on that number, two or three Social
> Credit. It never varied. I could always predict
> the numbers.

This is another instance where respondents saw the same thing, but labelled it differently. Those who thought that civic groups were nonpartisan cited the representation of all parties as evidence for it.

Table 18 summarizes the views of the characteristics of civic groups nominating candidates, again according

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[6]The same two mentioned above, p. 79.

to strength of party attachment to point out how they

appear to be unrelated.

TABLE 18

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACHMENT
AND VIEW OF CIVIC GROUPS[a]

View of Civic Groups	Attachment[b]				Total
	Strong or Fairly Strong M[c]	A[d]	Weak or None M	A	
All parties represented in a group	1	1	0	1	3
Operate only as nominators	1	4	1	5	11
Represent distince interests	1	2	0	0	3
Parties are represented	0	1	0	1	2
Activities are party-like	0	1	0	1	2

[a]Total is more than 18 because of multiple responses.

[b]Those with "no answer" on party attachment omitted.

[c]Mayor.   [d]Alderman.

It appears, from what we have seen so far in this

chapter, that agreement on the characteristics and justi-

fication of the type of system in Edmonton is lacking.

Disagreement does not generally follow strength of party

attachment or route into politics, or any other major independent variable examined in this study, suggesting it is related to some other factor (perhaps a 'personal-idiosyncratic" one[7]). It does seem, however, that the roles perceived by our respondents do not contain a clearly articulated, comprehensive "good government" philosophy, although parts of it do exist. Whether this is because the good government issue has been less salient in Canada can only be established by some sort of comparative analysis.

Perceptions of Interest Group Activity

Betty Zisk, Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt[6] have based much of their recent work on interviews with city councillors and leaders of interest groups to find out their attitudes towards each other and to discover whether councillors' role perceptions predispose them to "facilitate," "tolerate" or oppose interest group activity. It was in this regard in particular that they thought the assumptions underlying the use of the role perception approach would be most useful. Knowledge of a council's attitude toward group activity should allow anticipation of its reaction

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[7]See Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion . . ., p. 40.

[8]"City Councilmen and the Group Struggle: A Typology of Role Orientations," Journal of Politics, 27 (August 1965), 618-646.

to group-sponsored proposals, and even more generally of
its acceptance of a "referee" function for civic government.
We are often told that interest or pressure group activity
is more likely to be accepted as legitimate in the United
States than in Canada,[9] so this too is a reason for pur-
suing the "perception of group activity." Also, as was
stated previously, Kaplan's thesis is that groups will be
objectively uninfluential in the type of system examined
here.

Respondents were first asked the following question:

You hear a lot these days about the power of
interest groups in provincial and federal politics.
(a) Do such groups operate at the local level?
(b) What are the most powerful groups at this
level? Can you give me some examples?
(c) Do they make representations to the mayor,
council and administration, or do some concen-
trate on one in particular?
(d) What would you say are the main reasons for
their influence?[10]

Only three respondents did not feel that interest
groups operate locally. Given the large majority disagree-
ing with them, it would be academic to break down the re-
sponses. The three disagreeing were all community-service
type aldermen, but their reasons for disagreeing differed
slightly. One stated: "I'm supposed to be a member of the
establishment, but I'm not aware of any groups operating."
The other two thought pressure was at times exerted, but

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[9]Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making . . .," 550.

[10]See Appendix, question 41, Aldermanic Questionnaire.

by individuals, not groups. When asked to elaborate,
one of these respondents stated:

> I wouldn't like to name any individuals. Let's
> say that the present land policy is supported
> very strongly. Pressure is not exerted through
> bribes of any sort. Pressure is exerted by
> monopolists who have close association with the
> city administration. They are convinced that
> the city's best interests are the same as theirs.

However, agreement with the view that groups op-
erate at the local level did not imply belief that groups
were influential at this level. When asked to give rea-
sons for group influence, a number of respondents, par-
ticularly mayors, replied that groups were not influential.
Tables 19 and 20 give the replies by route into politics
and strength of party attachment.

From Table 19 it appears that respondents who came
to city politics via the party route were more likely to
mention the strength of groups in terms of economic power
or control over nominations than community-service types,
who were more likely to feel groups were uninfluential.
Perhaps the former are more sensitive to group power be-
cause of their party experience, even if groups are not
as powerful on the local level as on other levels. Only
the community-service and labor-union types mentioned lis-
tening to groups because they had valuable information and
experience to offer by virtue of their being involved in
situations being considered by council (called "stake in
society" in the table).

TABLE 19

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROUTE INTO POLITICS
AND REASONS GIVEN FOR GROUP INFLUENCE[a]

| Reasons Given for Group Influence | Route | | | | | | |
	Community Service M[b] A[c]		Party Route M A		Labor Union M A		Total
Objective strength	0	1	0	3	0	0	4
Stake in society	0	1	0	0	0	1	2
Contacts with aldermen	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Groups un-influential	1	3	0	1	1	0	6
No answer	0	1	0	0	0	0	1

[a]Those believing groups do not operate are omitted.

[b]Mayor.   [c]Alderman.

Table 20 shows that perception of group influence
does not appear to be related to strength of party at-
tachment except for the fact that most of those feeling
that groups are uninfluential have a strong or fairly
strong party attachment. However, if we combine the
results for these people and for those who feel groups do
not operate, the difference does not seem to be very
great (Table 21).

TABLE 20

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACHMENT AND
REASONS GIVEN FOR GROUP INFLUENCE[a]

Reasons for Group Influence	Attachment				
	Strong or Fairly Strong		Weak or None		Total
	M[b]	A[c]	M	A	
Objective strength	0	3	0	1	4
Stake in society	0	1	0	1	2
Contacts with aldermen	1	0	0	1	2
Groups un-influential	1	3	1	0	5

[a]Those with "no answer" or believing groups do not operate are omitted.

[b]Mayor. [c]Alderman.

There did not seem to be any differences among respondents with different backgrounds with regard to the examples given of powerful interest groups. Business groups were mentioned most frequently (e.g., Chamber of Commerce, Retail Merchants Association), with "single-purpose" groups (groups springing into action on specific issues such as fluoridation or bridge location, then disappearing when these issues are resolved) next. Labor groups, recreation associations, and advisory groups (e.g., Edmonton

Welfare Council) meritted few responses.

TABLE 21

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRENGTH OF PARTY ATTACHMENT
AND BELIEF IN GROUP INFLUENCE[a]

Party Attachment	Perception of Group Influence			
	Operate & Influential	Operate & Uninfluential	Do Not Operate	Total
Strong or fairly strong	5	4	1	10
Weak or none	3	1	2	6

[a]Those with "no answer" omitted. Responses of mayors and aldermen combined.

A follow-up question was designed to discover whether certain groups were listened to by aldermen and mayors, but were not perceived as "interest groups" because their activity was not construed as "pressure." The question was:

> (a) Are there any groups whose advice ought to be considered whether they happen to be powerful or not?
> (b) Would you name some of these groups in Edmonton?
> (c) Could you tell me what there is about these groups that makes them worth listening to? [11]

It was thought beforehand that community-service types, who tend to be business and professional people,

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[11]See Appendix, question 42, Aldermanic Questionnaire.

and nominees of a business-dominated group, would consider
"powerful interest groups" to be mainly single-purpose
groups rather than ongoing groups, especially those
supporting business policies. In fact (Table 22), while
single-purpose groups were not mentioned by anyone as "groups
that ought to be listened to whether they happen to be
powerful or not," business groups were mentioned by these
people (community-service) as powerful interest and as
nonpowerful groups which should be heard. Beyond this
there did not seem to be any pattern except that, signifi-
cantly, "advisory and welfare" groups were mentioned more
frequently as nonpowerful groups which ought to be lis-
tened to. Also, none of the party-route or labor-
union types mentioned business groups in these terms.
Most respondents (nine) felt nonpowerful groups should
be listened to because of the information they could
provide. A few (five), however, mentioned this as a
way of getting the opinions of the represented--or as a
channel of interest articulation. In fact, most respondents
felt that the system would operate worse if there were no
groups trying to influence council, because "it would
operate in a vacuum." It seems that in an "at-large"
"nonpartisan" system, even though the respondents resist
a delegate representational role, they are cognizant of
the problems of discovering the opinions of the represented.

Another question which it was felt might produce

TABLE 22

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ROUTE INTO POLITICS
AND EXAMPLES OF POWERFUL AND
NON-POWERFUL GROUPS[a]

Examples of Power- ful and Nonpowerful Groups	Route into Politics							
	Community Service		Party Route		Labor Union		Total	
	P[b]	N-P[b]	P	N-P	P	N-P	P	N-P
No answer	--	5	-	0	-	1	-	6
Business	5	3	2	0	1	0	8	3
Labor	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Single-purpose	3	0	2	0	1	0	6	0
Recreation	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	2
Advisory & welfare	0	3	0	2	1	0	1	5
"All groups"	-	4	-	2	-	0	-	6

[a]Contains multiple responses. Responses of mayors and
aldermen combined.

[b]Abreviations: "P" for powerful, and "N-P" for
nonpowerful. Blanks in table indicate that category was
not used.

interesting results in a system where a professional ad-
ministration has a large responsibility and discretion in
administrative matters, and where council might be jealous
of attempts to bypass the council, asked for respondents'
opinions of group activity involving the administration:

> Some people feel that group activity on behalf
> of a particular interest which involves making
> representations to the administration should
> be discouraged. How do you feel about this?
> Why do you feel this way?[12]

A majority of respondents saw nothing basically

wrong with this kind of activity. The largest category

of responses mentioned that it relieved the council of

a great deal of unnecessary work. They felt it was

natural for groups to go to the administration on "ad-

ministrative" matters, and that the council should be

approached only when satisfaction wasn't given by the

administration or when a matter of policy change was

involved. As is suggested in Chapter VII, it appears that

the "inventors" in this system are reasonably confident

that their "policy-making" role is not being usurped.

The only opposition came from those who felt groups

were "necessarily" selfish and that the administration

should be concerned with the general welfare instead of

meeting group demands.

All this seems to be congruent with the adoption

by most of the aldermen and mayors of a role we have

called "inventor." They are content to sit back and "make

policy," yet welcome group representations as part of the

information (not power or pressure) they must consider in

making their decisions. It seems that group power or

influence is not feared, hence the mild reaction to sug-

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[12]See Appendix, question 44, Aldermanic Questionnaire.

gestions of group influence. The large majority of

respondents admit that incumbency virtually guarantees

re-election, making the currying of group favor

apparently unnecessary. Most of these respondents also

feel that "individual aldermen are not held personally

responsible for policy decisions," indicating that they

themselves feel that they are unlikely targets for group

retaliation (Table 23). Most of the mayors also agree with

this assessment of the alderman's electoral position.

TABLE 23

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELIEF THAT INCUMBENCY ASSURES
RE-ELECTION AND BELIEF THAT ALDERMEN ARE NOT
HELD PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICY
DECISIONS[a]

Held Personally Responsible?	Re-Election Assured?				
	Yes M[b] A[c]		No M A		Total
Yes	0	0	1	2	3
No	2	8	0	4	14

[a]"No answer" omitted. [b]Mayor. [c]Alderman.

The mayors and commissioners concur in this as-

sessment of the role played by groups in the local pol-

itical system. They feel that they should "take every-

body's advice. If they have something good to offer take

it. But keep yourself in a position so you can reject it."

As expected, group "advice" should be accepted only if it is concerned with the "interests of the collectivity." "If a group's demands are in its own selfish interest to the detriment of the body politic, it should be resisted." However, one mayor stated "off the record" that the Chamber of Commerce exerts an influence which exceeds these bounds. Even with this exception, however, the respondents in this study did not perceive their role as being primarily a referree in the struggle of groups for influence on public policy.

CHAPTER VII

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG COUNTER POSITIONS:
ALDERMAN, MAYOR, COMMISSIONER

As was pointed out in Chapter II, the role associated
with a position takes on meaning only if one studies that
position in conjunction with other positions related to
it in an institutional structure. Relationships between
the position of alderman and two other positions, mayor
and commissioner, will be examined here.[1]

It appears from Chapter V that the aldermen demonstrate
almost complete agreement on the adoption of an inventor
role for themselves. However, their ability to pursue
this role depends on their relationships with the mayor
and commissioners, relationships which are possible foci of
conflict in role definition, with consequent implications
for group harmony and efficiency.

As might be expected, the mayors are jealous of any
interference with their own role in administration, and
favor a subordinate role in government for the alderman.
As one put it:

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[1]Examination of other conceivable relationships, al-
ready outlined theoretically (Chapters II and III), between
aldermen and group spokesmen and constituents, must be left
until a similar study is conducted to illuminate the group
and constituent side of the relationship.

The aldermen are analogous to directors of a corporation. They ought to be reasonable-thinking men with some degree of experience in a variety of fields. They should consist of a cross-section of community living and thinking. They ought to formulate policy, but should not under any circumstances be administrators. There are two distinct parts to civic government: administration and policy-making.

The majority of the aldermen accepted a subordinate role for themselves in relation to the mayor, but five replied that they were the equals of the mayor in "policy-making," although they respected his special position in administration--up to a point. The best example of this view was the following:

> As I see it, in Edmonton there was a tendency on the part of past councils to accept that the mayor and commissioners run the city. Council has equal responsibility with the mayor in the development of policy. The mayor is chairman of the board and should encourage discussion in council and elicit the opinion of council. He should be a catalyst. He is going to have a greater knowledge of the day-to-day operation of the city, but he is not more qualified as a molder of public opinion or as a representative of the public. The aldermen should not go into departmental operation, but the mayor should, as chairman, be responsible to see that council's policy is carried out.

We can see that this revised statement of the respective roles of alderman and mayor does not extend the authority of the council, but redefines the mayor's position to be one of a spokesman for council, responsible for implementing the council's decisions. This, in a supposedly executive-dominated system, demonstrates the independence and usefulness of the role approach.

These same people disagree with the mayor's relationship to the commissioners, feeling he represents the views of the commissioners on council instead of the other way around. They feel he lacks independence from the professional administration, hence his usefulness as a spokesman for the council is impaired. (Paradoxically, the commissioners, when interviewed, welcomed the presence of the mayor at their meetings, feeling he brought to them a "fresh, independent viewpoint.")

Five of the notorious "group of seven"[2] felt that the mayor's independence from the administration was in doubt, which may have prompted them to participate in forcing a decision on the appointment of a chief commissioner, which seems calculated to remove much of the responsibility for administration from the shoulders of the mayor.

One mayor in summing up his analysis of mayor-council conflict admitted that the aldermen may be jealous of the mayor's privileged position:

> There is always a little bit of envy and jealousy. After all, they [alderman and mayor] are political positions. They hate to see the mayor in the limelight all the time.

As for the relationship between aldermen and commissioners, this study has had to rely on the literature on the city manager plan as a source of hypotheses which seem

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[2]Seven aldermen, constituting a majority of council, were able to force a special meeting by virtue of their number, hence the name "Group of Seven," coined by the press.

to be applicable in theory to the commissioner-council

system.3

Basically, this literature (especially City Politics)

outlines a role for the city manager which is structured in

relationship to cleavages (economic, social, or ethnic) with-

in the city, represented by cleavages within the council.

Depending on the presence or absence of a strong mayor, the

manager is likely to assume a "political role" (defined as

leadership in policy-making accompanied by balancing of

council factions), or have one thrust upon him, even though

he is appointed as an administrator. Banfield and Wilson

outline the possibilities in a typology of council-manager

relations.4 The accurate placement of Edmonton in this

scheme would require a study beyond the scope of the pre-

sent one, but Edmonton does appear to present some of the

characteristics associated with "Type 4": "an alliance of

'good government'-minded citizens and business-minded mer-

chants [supporting] a citizens' association which elects a

majority of the council," giving the manager [commissioner]

3See for example Banfield and Wilson, City Politics,
chap. 13; Kammerer et al., City Managers in Politics; Adrian,
"Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities . . .;"
Edwin K. Stene and George K. Floro, Abandonment of the City
Manager Plan (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press,
1953); Edward C. Banfield, ed., Urban Government (New York:
The Free Press, Inc., 1961), pp. 213-216, 253-265; Dorothy
Strauss Pealy, "The Need for Elected Leadership," Public
Administration Review, 18 (September 1958) 214-16; Karl A.
Bosworth, "The Manager is a Politician," Public Administra-
tion Review, 18 (September 1958) 216-222.

4Op. cit., pp. 177-180.

a secure and powerful position.[5]

This study did not assume in advance that the commissioners would experience conflict with the aldermen, but felt that the position of commissioners as experts and as a major source of policy-proposals for the council provided a possible focus of conflict.

A survey of the responses reveals no important disagreement between aldermen and commissioners on role definition. The commissioners expressed the belief that "the most important thing is to carry out the administrative office of council, to carry out their policies and wishes." The aldermen concur, but nevertheless, eleven of the fifteen aldermen interviewed reported conflict with the commissioners. The reasons given are based mostly on quarrels with policy recommendations of the commissioners.

Surprisingly enough, most (four) of those who disagreed did so on technical matters where the commissioners are deemed to be most knowledgable. They disagreed on such things as snow-removal operations, feasibility of using certain coal fields for power generation, allocation of development costs, issues where one would expect the "expert" to be deferred to, as opposed to areas one would more usu-

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[5]Ibid., p. 179. Verification of the extent of their "power" in Edmonton must await further study; however, their "security" is attested to by the fact that the two commissioners interviewed have both held their posts for fifteen years.

ally associate with "policy-making," such as the effect of particular policies on the public. Alleged lack of concern for the latter on the part of the commissioners was the next largest category of disagreement (three), although an equal number cited disagreement "only in particular cases." One respondent said that he disagreed when he felt that the commissioners were attempting to deceive the council. He cited examples where he "knew" that decisions of the Commission Board recommended to council for approval were not unanimously supported by the mayor and commissioners, yet they were presented without dissenting opinions.

Half of the group of aldermen went so far as to agree when presented with the statement "some people feel administrators play a political role."[6]

Both those who did and did not believe administrators play a political role were asked to define it (Table 24). The most common definition by both groups was "currying public favor" or being concerned with the public's reaction to particular policies rather than letting the council take responsibility. Only those who did believe that administrators play a political role mentioned "trying to influence decisions" made by council, and "deviation from council's policy."

It would seem likely that technical disagreement and

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[6]See Appendix, question 39, Aldermanic Questionnaire.

TABLE 24

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELIEF THAT ADMINISTRATORS
PLAY A POLITICAL ROLE AND DEFINITION
OF POLITICAL ROLE[a]
(Aldermen Only)

Administrators Play a Political Role?	Definition of Political Role			
	Currying Public Favor	Lack of Objectivity	Deviating from Policy	Trying to Influence Decisions
Yes	4	0	2	2
No	3	1	0	0
Total	7	1	2	2

[a]Those with "no answer" omitted.

belief that administrators play a political role would

relate to a "suspicion of the expert" on the part of the

aldermen. This possibility is suggested by the treatment

given by Wahlke et al. to the problem of pursuing an "in-

ventor" role orientation:

> Once the technological development of society has
> reached a scale where expert knowledge rather than
> lay enlightenment has become a condition of ef-
> fective government, where the scope of govern-
> mental activities has increased so enormously that
> general understanding is not sufficient as a source
> of decision-making, formulation of public policy
> tends to be either a function of the executive,
> with its corps of expert civil servants, or the
> product of policy suggestions from well-informed
> interested groups outside the formal governmental
> structure.[7]

[7]The Legislative System, p. 254.

Aldermen we have classified as inventors could be expected to resist this possibility.

When asked whether they felt the commissioners possessed a monopoly of information which they could use to influence policy-making,[8] all but three of the aldermen thought it possible, making this an important potential source of friction between administration and council. However, half of those feeling deception was possible believed it did not in fact occur, or, if it did, was accidental.

The possibilities for conflict, because of the privileged position in administration of the mayor and commissioners, were mentioned by the mayors and commissioners too, indicating that they are aware of the problem, although they discount its objective importance.

As one commissioner put it:

Well, we haven't any monopoly. The difference
is that they don't have enough experience to
know what information they require. We try to
give most information, but reports are some-
times skimpy. Professional people are inclined
to leave things out because they feel they're
obvious. They carry things in their heads.

All the mayors concurred in this judgment, but one, a former alderman, expressed sympathy with the alderman's plight:

[8] See Appendix, question 35, Aldermanic Questionnaire.

The aldermen feel [that commissioners withhold information]. I can remember when I was an alderman. I was very suspicious. I always thought they were trying to put something over on me. It's unfortunate, but I know the feeling exists. They [suspected] me of it too. It's not true.

Strangely enough, however, the response to the statement "some people feel that the commissioners possess a monopoly of information which they can use to influence choices among policies," did not appear to relate strongly to the belief that administrators play a political role (Table 25). While none of those who believed administrators play a political role denied that the commissioners had a potential monopoly on information, less than half thought they used this knowledge to manipulate choices.

TABLE 25

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELIEF IN COMMISSIONER
MONOPOLY ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF IN
ADMINISTRATORS' POLITICAL
ROLE
(Aldermen Only)

Political Role?	Monopoly on Information?			
	Yes	No	Possible	Total
Yes	2	0	4	6
No	4	2	0	6
No Answer	0	1	2	3

A look at Table 26 gives a further indication that the problem of control over the experts, who have certain advantages because of their expertise and access to information on city administration, does not appear to be considered a problem by all of those who feel administrators

TABLE 26

LOSS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND BELIEF THAT ADMINISTRATORS PLAY A POLITICAL ROLE
(Aldermen Only)

Political Role?	Loss of Political Leadership to Expert?					
	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Mostly Disagree	Disagree Strongly	No Answer	Total
Yes	0	2	4	0	0	6
No	0	3	2	0	1	6
No Answer	1	0	0	1	1	3

play a political role. In fact, a slight majority of those believing that administrators play a political role tend to disagree with the statement "The increasing complexity of community problems inevitably pushes political leadership into the hands of the expert and out of the hands of the legislative body."[9] In addition, all of those who, while believing that administrators play a political role, disagree with this statement, define "political role" more

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[9]See Appendix, question 49(r), Aldermanic Questionnaire.

traditionally as "currying public favor" and "deviating from council's policy" rather than "trying to influence decisions." (Not shown in tabular form.)

However, a look at Table 27 indicates that for a number of respondents the monopoly of information on the part of the commissioners is the key to the possible loss of political leadership by the council. Almost the same number, however, even though agreeing that a monopoly of

TABLE 27

LOSS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND BELIEF THAT COM-
MISSIONERS POSSESS MONOPOLY ON INFORMATION
(Aldermen Only)

Monopoly on Information?	Loss of Political Leadership to Expert?					
	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Mostly Disagree	Disagree Strongly	No Answer	Total
Yes	0	3	2	0	1	6
No	0	0	2	0	1	3
Possible	1	2	2	1	0	6

information exists or is possible, do not feel council's leadership is threatened. It may be that they feel so secure in their roles as inventors that they do not believe that the commissioners could influence them by withholding information, because they can get it on their own if they have to. Support for this interpretation comes from this

respondent:

> I haven't come across it [withholding of infor-
> mation] yet. Let's face it; they have more in-
> formation than I have in the short run. Each has
> pet projects he'll fight for, but there's nothing
> wrong with that. I can get all the information
> I want if I look for it.

One respondent even took offense at the statement

suggesting commissioner monopoly:

> That's a biased question! Of necessity he [the
> commissioner] must know all the details about
> every matter that comes before council. The
> inference of your question is that he deliberate-
> ly attempts to mislead council. It's not prac-
> tical for every detail to be presented to council.

Not surprisingly, given the foregoing, none of the

respondents thought that they faced much difficulty in get-

ting their own policy ideas implemented.

Turning to the commissioner side of the relationship,

we find that they are aware of the type of criticism

levelled at someone in their position, but they, like many

of the aldermen, discount its importance. As one put it:

> I work for the welfare of the city of Edmonton.
> They sometimes feel the commissioners are work-
> ing in their own interests, empire-building,
> that sort of thing. Not many of them are like
> that. Most of them give you credit for what you
> do.

The seeds of "role conflict" appear to exist in

Edmonton, from an examination of the expectations enter-

tained by the aldermen, mayors and commissioners for each

other. There appears to be a basic consensus on the role

of inventor among aldermen, bringing with it suspicion of

attempts to usurp it on the part of the mayor or commis-

sioners. Ideally, the findings in this chapter should be followed up by a study of the policy-making process in council, to see whether the role espoused by each of the participants accords with actual performance.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This study has constructed the "role of alderman"
empirically, by interviewing actual incumbents of the pos-
ition of alderman. The position of alderman has been re-
lated, on the perceptual level, to political socialization
and recruitment into civic politics, the context of civic
politics, and to the counter positions of mayor and com-
missioner.

This study, using the approach of investigating "role
perception," found differences among incumbents of the
position of alderman not obvious from analysis conducted
only on the system level. The aldermen and mayors in this
study fell into two groups distinguished by their routes
into civic politics, the strength of their party attachments,
and their plans to seek office on the provincial and federal
levels of government. Those with strong or fairly strong
party attachments indicated less of a commitment to the
local system, while those with weak or no party attachments,
largely "community service" types, sought to maintain their
local positions.

However, the influences of party attachment and route
into politics did not relate to differing conceptions of
the local political system. Regardless of party attachment,

and route into politics, the respondents saw the process
of local government as distinct in nature from the pro-
vincial and federal systems. We have attributed this to
the influence of a nonpartisan, at-large electoral system,
and commissioner-council system on the role perception of
respondents. Theoretically (Chapter III), office holders
in this type of system should adopt an "inventor role".
With one important exception, all respondents accepted this
as their role. The exception, however, classified as a
"tribune," indicates the potential for role conflict among
aldermen. If the tribune role developed in response to
the demands of groups disadvantaged in an inventor-dom-
inated system, we may expect to find further opposition
developing if system unresponsiveness increases, thus
creating a system disturbance which might manifest itself
in the modification of the inventor role.

The role of the executive in this type of system
has been viewed in the literature[1] as discouraging the
active participation of aldermen in policy formation.
The findings of this study indicate that, at least on the
perceptual level, this is not the case. The aldermen sub-
scribe to an inventor role orientation, probably the most
difficult one to pursue in an "executive-centered" system,
where mayor and administration would prefer a "rubber
stamp" council (Chapter V). These findings indicate

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[1]See especially Kaplan, "Politics and Policy-Making."

that an investigation of the respective roles actually
played in policy formation by mayor, commissioners, and
aldermen, should be undertaken. Even if, objectively,
the aldermanic role is less important than it is perceived
to be, aldermanic role perceptions could be associated
with important modifications in policy-proposals coming
from the executive.

With further reference to responsiveness and dir-
ection of output, it is difficult to decide whether this
council consists of "facilitators," "tolerants" or
"antagonists," using the terminology of Zisk et al.,[2] with
regard to interest group activity. They do seem to be
"tolerant" of group submissions on policy questions, but
perhaps this is because "pressure" is not suspected. It
is natural for an "inventor" to want all the information
to be in when making policy decisions of the importance he
ascribes to them. Using the assumptions underlying the
use of the concept of role, we can further conclude that
policy-making will not be viewed by aldermen, mayors and
commissioners in a pluralistic context, where the purpose
of policy-making is to compromise among conflicting group
demands. Instead, group submissions will have to allay the
suspicion that they are not favoring the interests of
particular groups at the expense of the community as a

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[2] "City Councilmen and the Group Struggle . . . ."

whole.

The findings in this study also show the need for comparative investigation. The fact that aldermen in this study do not all subscribe to the "good government philosophy" (Chapter VI), yet adopt the role predicted for them from a discussion of this philosophy, suggests that an interesting study could be made between Canada and the United States, to see to what extent the structural features of local political systems influence role perception, independently of philosophical justifications for the system.

Further comparative work is needed to see whether the existence of the inventor role orientation is affected by differences in electoral and institutional systems in local government. Most of the support for the inventor interpretation here has been predicated upon an assumption that the electoral system presents little hindrance to the adoption of this role. Presumably elections on a ward basis, and strong interest group activity could make aldermen more vulnerable and hence more reluctant to ignore special and sectional demands.

This study has served to indicate that "role perception" has considerable theoretical importance in explanation, as an intervening variable between system characteristics and overt behavior; and has considerable predictive power with respect to values embodied in decisions, and potential

sources of friction among participants in the policy-making
process.

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   Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
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   Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities,"
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
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# APPENDIX

ALDERMANIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE[1]

1. First a couple of questions about your background.
    (a) Where were you born?
   (b) In what year?

2. Where did you grow up? Did you spend most of the years
when you were growing up in a city, a small town, or on a
farm?

3. How many years have you lived in Edmonton?

4. Now would you tell me a little bit about your education--
where you went to school?
    Have you had any post-secondary education?

5. (a) What is your principal occupation?
    (b) Has this been your main occupation all your
working life?
    (c) What other work have you done and for how long?

6. How did you become interested in politics? For example:
    (a) What is your earliest recollection of being inter-
ested in it?
    (b) Just what clinched your decision to go into
politics yourself?
    (c) What other members of your family or close re-
latives held public or political office before you did?
    (d) How did it come about that you ran for alderman?
    (e) Do you expect to continue to run for council?
Why is that?
    (f) Are there any other political or governmental
positions, local, provincial, or federal, which you would
like to seek? What are they?

7.   (a) What governmental or party positions had you
held before taking your council seat?
    (b) Do you hold any such positions now?

8. How strong an attachment do you feel for any provincial
or federal party? Very strong? Fairly strong? Weak? None?

9. How long have you been an alderman?

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[1]The mayors in the study were presented with a
slightly modified version of this questionnaire.

10. Now a couple of questions about the job of being an alderman.

  (a) First of all, how would you describe the job of being an alderman? What is the most important thing you should do?

  (b) Are there any important differences between what you think the job is and the way the general public sees it?

  (c) What is the most difficult part of being an alderman?

11. (a) What should be the relationship of the alderman to the mayor?

  (b) Does he share this view?

12. Is there any particular subject or field of legislation in which you consider yourself expert when it comes to dealing with proposed legislation in that field?

  (b) Why is that?

  (c) Could you name 3 or 4 aldermen whom you consider particularly expert in their respective fields?

13. Under our present system does the individual alderman have any chance of getting his own program or policy ideas implemented?

  (b) How can he do this?

  (c) Should he do this, or is his first obligation to the mayor's program?

14. Are there any changes that could be made to improve his chances?

15. Are there any persistent voting blocs on council? In what circumstances?

16. Is there anyone among the present council to whom you look for advice when deciding how to vote on an issue?

17. Does anyone ask you for advice on particular issues? What kind?

18. In your role as alderman do you ever feel you are pursuing something called the public interest? What does this mean to you?

19. Is there anything about the job of alderman you find particularly satisfying? Particularly dissatisfying?

20. Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about the various jobs in civic government:

(a) First of all what should the mayor do in order to be most effective in his job?

(b) Commissioners?

21. Our system of government has been described as non-partisan because political parties do not field candidates in elections. How do you feel about this type of system? Why is that?

22. Do groups such as the Better Civic Government Committee and the Civic Rights Protective Association fulfill some of the same functions as political parties? In what way?

23. Certain consequences are held to follow from the existence of the type of governmental system we have in Edmonton. I wonder if you would indicate which if any of the following are true of Edmonton. (Respondents were handed a list of these and asked to check whether they thought them "completely true," "somewhat true," "mostly false," or "completely false.")

(a) Nonpartisanship encourages the avoidance of issues in campaigns for alderman.

(b) Individual aldermen are not held personally responsible for policy decisions.

(c) In a system such as ours the incumbents are assured of re-election regardless of their performance.

(d) The mayor and the administration are the major forces in policy-formation with the council responsible mainly for deliberation and criticism.

(e) The system produces a council with a relatively high percentage of experienced members making for conservatism in a reluctance to change established policies.

(f) Nonpartisan cities are characterized by less political conflict than partisan cities.

24. What role should the administration play in civic government? That is, what distinguishes it from the elected representatives?

25. Does Edmonton's administration fulfill these requirements?

26. What is the purpose of the Board of Commissioners?

27. Does it fulfill that purpose?

28. Is there anything the commissioners are now doing that they shouldn't be? Why do you feel this way?

29. I noticed from reading council minutes that matters are often referred to the commissioners for a report. Just when is this done? On what kind of issues?

30. What kinds of reports do the commissioners present to council? Are any alternatives presented? Do you feel that all alternatives are presented?

31. On what grounds do they make their recommendations? That is, what do they bear in mind when making decisions? Do you agree with the way they are presented?

32. Some people feel that the part-time nature of the job of alderman affects the alderman's ability to judge commissioner recommendations. How do you feel about this? Why do you feel this way?

33. Are there any kinds of policies and recommendations you feel more able to criticize than others? What are they? Can you give me some examples? Why do you feel more competent to criticize these?

34. (a) What should the mayor do as chief commissioner?
(b) Do you feel he represents the views of council on the Board of Commissioners or the views of the Board on Council?
(c) Do you agree with this position? Why is that?

35. Some people feel that the commissioners possess a monopoly of information which they can use to influence choices among policies. Is this view justified? Why do you feel this way? Can you give me any examples?

36. Do your views on what is best for the city sometimes conflict with those of the commissioners? In what way in particular? Do you remember a recent example?

37. Is there anything an individual alderman can do when he disagrees with a particular recommendation of the commissioners?

38. Are there any changes you would recommend for the system?

39. Some people feel administrators play a political role. How do you feel about this? What does a political role mean to you?

40. Do you feel that the administration in this city and local professional people are competent to handle most of the technical questions that arise? When should we seek

outside advice? Do you feel that at present we seek outside
advice too often, about the right amount, not often enough?

41. You hear a lot these days about the power of interest
groups in provincial and federal politics.
        (a) Do such groups operate at the local level?
        (b) What are the most powerful groups at this level?
Can you give me some examples?
        (c) Do they make representations to the mayor, council
and administration or do some concentrate on one in par-
ticular? Which ones?
        (d) What would you say are the main reasons for
their influence?

42. (a) Are there any groups whose advice ought to be
considered whether they happen to be powerful or not?
        (b) Would you name some of these groups in Edmonton?
        (c) Could you tell me what there is about these groups
that makes them worth listening to?

43. (a) Would you say that, on the whole, the city govern-
ment would work much better, somewhat better, about the
same, womewhat worse, or much worse if there were no groups
trying to influence legislation?
        (b) Why do you feel that way?

44. Some people feel that group activity on behalf of a
particular interest which involves making representations
to the administration should be discouraged. How do you
feel about this? Why do you feel this way?

45. This question omitted.

46. It appears that issues such as bridge and roadway
development are usually referred to professional consultants
for study. On what factors do you think these people base
their decisions? Are these the same ones that you consider
relevant? Why is that?

47. Who usually initiates requests for zoning changes?
Do you feel that the motives and interests behind such
requests are fully disclosed? Why do you feel that way?
When do you think such requests should be granted?

48. (a) What are the most important things city govern-
ments should be doing?
        (b) Is there anything that prevents Edmonton from
doing this job effectively?
        (c) Do you feel that the other aldermen agree with
you on the scope of government?

49. The following comments have often been made about civic government and politics in general. I wonder if you would indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with them. (Respondents were handed a list of these comments and asked to check one of "agree strongly," "agree some-what," "mostly disagree," or "disagree strongly.")

      (a) Cities are businesses providing services and should be run along business lines.

      (b) City council's function is to set policy objectives and that of the administration to see that they are achieved.

      (c) Cities should expand their services just as provinces are doing.

      (d) The alderman is often the man in the middle between groups demanding different policies. His main job is to resolve those conflicts.

      (e) A city should not hesitate to increase its debts to finance public works projects if they cannot otherwise be paid for.

      (f) A master plan and a full-time professional planning staff are necessary to guide city development.

      (g) A good index of the success of civic policies is a high rate of population increase.

      (h) Every city should provide for economic growth by attracting new industries and stimulating local business.

      (i) Every city should provide in its budget for amenities such as parks and libraries.

      (j) It is the job of the Chamber of Commerce, not the city, to attract new industry.

      (k) The tax burden on property owners should be kept to a minimum by having the city provide only essential services.

      (l) Civic government doesn't have any single mission or function. Its job is to mediate between group demands for changes in government policy.

   (m) Bridges, freeways and parks should be built only as the city can afford them.

      (n) The job of an alderman is to work for what the people want even though this may not agree with his personal views.

      (o) Almost nobody in the city cares about policy issues unless a proposal happens to touch his personal or business interests.

      (p) There are so many different kinds of people in this city it is impossible to find out what they want the alderman to do.

      (q) It is the responsibility of the alderman to judge each proposal on its merits and not on the basis of how he thinks the voters feel about it.

      (r) The increasing complexity of community problems inevitably pushes political leadership into the hands of the expert and out of the hands of the legislative body.

50. Is there anything I haven't covered in this study which you feel I should have covered?

COMMISSIONER INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1. First a couple of questions about your background.
   (a) Where were you born?
   (b) In what year?
   (c) Did you spend most of your time growing up on a farm, in a small town, or in a city?

2. How many years have you lived in Edmonton?

3. Now can you tell me a little about your education, where you went to school?

4. What did you do before you became an Edmonton city commissioner? For how long?

5. How long have you been a city commissioner?

6. Has your interest in government always been in administration?

7. Is there a particular subject area in which you consider yourself particularly expert? Why is that?

8. Have you been given adequate opportunity while a commissioner to exercise that specialty?

9. Have you ever considered becoming active in politics? Why is that? (If yes), at what level--local, provincial, federal?

10. How strong an attachment do you feel for any provincial or national party, very strong, fairly strong, weak, or none at all?

11. Do you have any desire to seek an administrative position at another level of government? In private enterprise? Why is that?

12. How would you describe the job of commissioner? What are the most important things you should do?

13. Are there any important differences between the way you view the job and the way the council looks at it?

14. What role should the administration play in civic government? That is, what distinguishes its role from that of the elected representatives? Does Edmonton's administration fulfill that purpose?

15. What is the purpose of the Board of Commissioners?

16. Does it fulfill that purpose?

17. Do you feel that city council shares your view of the proper role of the Board of Commissioners? Why do you feel that way?

18. Is there anything the commissioners are doing now that they shouldn't be doing?

19. Are there any changes you would recommend for the system?

20. Is there a national or international professional association to which commissioners belong? Does this membership bring any benefits which help in your work?

21. Do you find that it makes a difference to your job what kind of man is in the mayor's chair? In what way?

22. Do you find that it makes a difference to your job what kind of people are sitting on city council? In what way?

23. I notice from reading council minutes that matters are sometimes referred to the commissioners for reports. Just when is this done? On what kinds of issues?

24. Do the aldermen ever refer things to you in order to avoid making a decision themselves? When is that?

25. Some council members in the past have maintained that you possess a monopoly on information which you can use to influence choices among policies? Is this view justified? Why do you feel that way?

26. How important a source of information are you to council?

27. Do you find that views on what is best for the city sometimes conflict with those of individuals on city council? In what way in particular? Can you give me some examples? If they disagree do you feel there is anything you can do to change their minds? Do you ever try?

28. Some people feel that the part-time nature of the job of alderman affects the alderman's ability to judge commissioner recommendations. How do you feel about this?

29. Do you find it wise to present council with a wide range of alternative policies, or is it better to present them with an integrated proposal, fully worked out? Why is that?

30. Do you feel that decisions made by council reflect rational, technical considerations of alternatives presented by the Board of Commissioners, or do they reflect various pressures such as those from competing interest groups, voter demands, or council voting blocs? On all issues?

31. What can you do when you know from training and experience that council has made a bad decision?

32. Many people believe that the only problem an administrator at the top level has is making recommendations to council. Do you find any resistance within the administration to these recommendations? Can you give me any examples?

33. What should the mayor do as chief commissioner? Should he represent the views of council on the Board of Commissioners, or the views of the Board on city council?

34. Some people feel that administrators play a political role. How do you feel about this? What does a political role mean to you?

35. In your role as commissioner do you ever feel you are pursuing something called the public interest? What does this mean to you?

36. Is there anything about your job that you find particularly satisfying? Particularly dissatisfying?

37. Do you feel that the administration in this city and local professional people are competent to handle most of the technical questions that arise? When should we seek outside advice? Do you feel that at the present time we seek outside advice too often, about the right amount, or not often enough?

38. You yourself have a large number of technical and administrative responsibilities placed on you as commissioner. Is there something you do better than others? Why is that?

39. It seems that issues such as bridges and roadway development are often referred to professional consultants for study. On what kinds of factors do these people base their decisions? Are they the same ones you consider relevant?

40. Who usually initiates requests for zoning changes? Do you feel that the motives and interests behind such requests are fully disclosed? Why do you feel that way? When should such requests be granted?

41. Who usually raises the issues considered by council: the commissioners, the mayor, aldermen, group spokesmen?

42. This question omitted.

43. You hear a lot these days about the power of interest groups in provincial and federal politics.
    (a) Do such groups operate at the local level?
    (b) What are the most powerful groups at this level?
    (c) Do they make representations to the mayor, council, and administration or do some concentrate on one in particular? Which ones?
    (d) What would you say are the main reasons for their influence?

44. (a) Are there any groups whose advice ought to be considered whether they happen to be powerful or not?
    (b) Would you name some of these groups in Edmonton?
    (c) Could you tell me what there is about these groups that makes them worth listening to?

45. Some people feel that group activity on behalf of a particular interest which involves making representations to the administration rather than to the elected representatives should be discouraged. How do you feel about this? Why do you feel this way?

46. (a) Would you say that, on the whole, the city government would work much better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse if there were no groups trying to influence legislation?
    (b) Why do you feel that way? What particular organizations do you have in mind?

47. (a) What are the most important things city governments should be doing?
    (b) Is there anything that prevents Edmonton from doing this job effectively?
    (c) Do feel that the aldermen agree with you on the scope of government?

48. The following comments have often been made about
civic government and politics in general. You have had
some considerable experience in city government and I
would be interested to find out how strongly you agree or
disagree with them. You'll find that some of these comments
don't pertain directly to administration, but I hope you
will give me your opinion anyway. (Respondents were handed
a list of these comments and asked to check one of "agree
strongly," "agree somewhat," "mostly disagree," or "dis-
agree strongly." The list of comments is similar to the
list for aldermen. Gaps in lettering indicate comments
which were omitted.)

(a) Cities are businesses providing services and
should be run along business lines.

(b) City council's function is to set policy ob-
jectives and that of the administration to see that they
are achieved.

(c) Cities should expand their services just as
provinces are doing.

(e) A city should not hesitate to increase its
debts to finance public works projects if they cannot
otherwise be paid for.

(f) A master plan and a full-time professional plan-
ning staff are necessary to guide city development.

(g) A good index of the success of civic policies is
a high rate of population increase.

(h) Every city should provide for economic growth
by attracting new industries and stimulating local
business.

(i) Every city should provide in its budget for
amenities such as parks and libraries.

(j) It is the job of the Chamber of Commerce, not
the city, to attract new industry.

(k) The tax burden on property owners should be kept
to a minimum by having the city provide only essential
services.

(m) Bridges, freeways and parks should be built only
as the city can afford them.

(o) Almost nobody in the city cares about policy
issues unless a proposal happens to touch his personal or
business interests.

(r) The increasing complexity of community problems
inevitably pushes political leadership into the hands of
the expert and out of the hands of the legislative body.

(s) The purpose of city manager and commissioner sys-
tems is to reconcile democracy with efficiency.